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Introduction
Contracts are written to commit economic agents to a course of action that does not nec-
essarily coincide with their preferred choice in all possible future contingencies. Hence,
the decision whether to join a contract involves a careful evaluation of the overall ex-
pected, personal benefit. A recent literature analyzes profit-maximizing contracts for
scenarios in which agents can acquire relevant information during that deliberation.
The first two chapters of this dissertation contribute to this literature: I demonstrate
the benefits of stochastic contracts and sequential screening mechanisms.
To this end, I use a principal-agent model that deals with bilateral trading. Both
parties do initially not know the agent’s preferences over possible trade agreements.
While deliberating whether to accept a contract, the agent can spend resources to in-
vestigate the state. The agent’s preferences might of course be relevant for the principal
as well, given that she must decide about the terms of trade. But contractual clauses
on information acquisition or its truthful transmission are not court-enforceable; these
acts are unobservable and unverifiable, respectively. Moreover, the principal herself
does not have the possibility to investigate the state.
From a design perspective, such contractual relationships involve the following prob-
lem. Initially, the agent only has an ex-ante outside option—the possibility to decide
about his participation without any information about his preferences. Through pre-
contractual investigation, however, he can acquire an ex-interim outside option—the
possibility to decide conditional on his findings. Indeed, contracts that allocate all ex-
pected surplus to the principal are generally unprofitable for the agent in some states,
as the terms of trade cannot directly condition on the agent’s preferences. The principal
has basically two alternatives. One possibility is to offer a separating contract (i.e., a
contract which encourages the agent to investigate the state and reveal his findings).
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But then she cannot fully appropriate the expected surplus because the contract must
be ex-interim individually rational to ensure the agent’s participation. Alternatively,
the principal could propose a pooling contract (i.e., a contract which does not encour-
age investigation). In that case, she may appropriate the expected surplus, but only if
investigation costs are sufficiently high relative to the traded quantity. Otherwise, the
agent would find it too risky to accept the contract without having checked his payoff
in advance. Thus, the principal must generally make a trade-off between efficiency and
surplus extraction.
Chapters 1 and 2 describe optimal solutions to this trade-off. In Chapter 1, I
consider the case that information gathering can be postponed until after signing. It
turns out that the principal does actually not search for a profit-maximizing contract
among the pooling and separating ones. Specifically, contracts take the form of a
lottery, the lots being a pooling and separating schedule. After signing, one of the two
schedules is implemented according to some probability distribution. The key insight
is that such stochastic contracts can reconcile full surplus extraction with incentives for
information gathering, for unless the separating schedule is implemented with certainty,
precontractual investigation still comes at a price.
Chapter 2 qualifies a finding by Crémer and Khalil (1992), according to which pre-
contractual investigation should never be encouraged if the agent anyway learns his
preferences after signing, before the contract is carried out. I show that this result does
typically not extend beyond the case in which precontractual investigation removes all
uncertainty about the unknown state. In a nutshell, the principal offers a separating
contracts if and only if she benefits from sequential screening. Sequential screening
mechanisms potentially facilitate her trade-off because they entail choice under uncer-
tainty for the agent unless he can acquire perfect information.
Chapter 3, on the other hand, offers an explanation as to why incentive pay some-
times depends on subjective performance evaluations even though comprehensive objec-
tive appraisal systems seem feasible. Subjective evaluations involve the obvious problem
that compensation is left at the discretion of supervisors, who might be biased for var-
ious reasons. I argue that subjectivity can be a desirable property of a performance
measure. Specifically, employers might resort to subjective evaluations in order to with-
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hold information from their workers. I furthermore argue that this motive is particularly
strong under circumstances where the credibility issue associated with subjective mea-
sures can be solved at low costs. My explanation suggests that subjective performance
evaluations are used at early stages of long-term employment relationships in which
details that affect the worker’s productivity on the job are highly uncertain and can be
inferred from performance.
3
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Chapter 1
Endogenous Information and
Stochastic Contracts
Abstract. A growing literature analyzes profit-maximizing contracts for situations
in which agents can acquire private information before they decide whether to join the
contract. It is conjectured that the results also apply to the more natural scenario where
information can be acquired either before or after signing. This chapter shows that, in
fact, the latter scenario is more favorable for the principal. Using stochastic contracts,
she can induce information acquisition with some probability and yet appropriate the
generated surplus.
1.1 Introduction
A growing literature (Crémer et al., 1998a, Shi, 2012, and Szalay, 2009) analyzes profit-
maximizing contracts for situations with the following characteristics: (1) At the mo-
ment when the principal offers the contract, agents do not possess private information,
but (2) each agent can covertly investigate his payoff from the contract before he de-
cides whether to participate.1 It is conjectured that the results also apply to the more
natural scenario where information can be acquired either before or after the contract is
1A key objective of this literature is to examine comparative statics with respect to investigation
costs. The standard case of adverse selection, where agents are already privately informed at the
outset, obtains for zero investigation costs.
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signed.2 This chapter shows that, in fact, the difference is relevant. The latter scenario
features additional implementable outcomes, which might be more profitable for the
principal.
Consider the following procurement relationship. A principal demands customized
parts which the agent can produce. The costs at which the agent operates are initially
unknown to both parties. However, the agent can spend resources to learn the exact
state before he processes the order. His findings might clearly be relevant for the
principal, too, as she could tailor her demand more efficiently if she knew the agent’s
costs. But contractual clauses on information acquisition or its truthful transmission
are not court-enforceable; these acts are unobservable and unverifiable, respectively.
Moreover, the principal herself does not have the possibility to investigate the state.
Crémer et al. (1998a) study the optimal contract for this relationship under the
assumption that the agent can only acquire information between contract offer and
signing.3 In that case, the agent has the (costly) option to check his payoff from the
contract before he decides whether to join it. More importantly, if the contract provides
incentives which induce information acquisition, the agent knows his payoff at that date.
The principal has two alternatives: One possibility is to offer a separating contract (i.e.,
a contract which encourages the agent to investigate his costs and reveal his findings).
But then she cannot extract the entire surplus because the agent has private information
at signing.4 Alternatively, the principal could propose a pooling contract (i.e., a contract
which does not encourage information acquisition). In that case, she may appropriate
the generated surplus, but only if investigation costs are sufficiently high relative to
output. Otherwise, the agent would find it too risky to accept the contract without
having checked his payoff. Thus, the principal must generally make a trade-off between
2See footnote 1 in Crémer et al. (1998a).
3Szalay (2009) considers the same scenario but assumes that the precision of information depends
on the investigation effort. Shi (2012), in contrast, is concerned with optimal auction design and, thus,
allows for multiple agents. In his model, the precision of information is also endogenous, but he uses
a different ordering than Szalay.
4More precisely, the principal cannot extract the entire surplus if the agent is to produce some
minimum output regardless of his costs.
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efficiency and surplus extraction.
I depart from Crémer et al. (1998a) in that the agent can investigate his costs in
my model either between contract offer and signing, or afterwards. It turns out that
the principal must make the same trade-off but has more choices. First of all, the
relevant class of contracts differs. The principal does not search for an optimal contract
among the pooling and separating contracts. She can restrict herself to contracts which
will never induce the agent to acquire information before signing. Specifically, her
contract takes the form of a lottery—the lots being a pooling and a separating schedule.
After signing, one of these two schedules is implemented according to some probability
distribution.
Degenerate lotteries are essentially identical to the pooling and separating contracts.
Non-degenerate lotteries, on the other hand, can implement otherwise infeasible sched-
ules and thus extend the principal’s choice set. In a nutshell, this is because such
stochastic contracts entail uncertainty for the agent as to whether investigation costs
will be due after signing. Put differently, since the separating schedule is not imple-
mented with certainty, precontractual investigation still comes at a price. Therefore,
stochastic contracts only need to satisfy the weak participation condition that applied
to the pooling contracts. The principal may consequently appropriate the generated
surplus of both schedules if the price of precontractual investigation is sufficiently high
relative to output. I show that optimal contracts are stochastic under particular cir-
cumstances. Hence, the principal is better off when information can be gathered either
before or after signing, rather than only at the first date.
My analysis provides some insight into the fact that procurement contracts fre-
quently entitle the project owner to submit change orders as to contract amount, dead-
lines, designs, etc. (see Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). U.S. Government contracts, for
example, must generally include “a changes clause that permits the contracting officer
to make unilateral changes, in designated areas, within the general scope of the con-
tract” (FAR 43.201a). The use of change orders is often explained with bad project
management.5 However, it introduces uncertainty for the contractor about the services
5E.g., a panel on the Los Angeles Community College District’s rebuilding program “found that
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he will ultimately provide, which makes it difficult to examine in advance whether the
stipulated compensation is adequate. In this respect, contracts with changes clauses
resemble the stochastic contracts in my analysis.
Formally, the benefits of stochastic contracts are due to a relaxed participation con-
dition. Unlike with separating contracts, the agent may end up with a loss and yet
acquires information with some probability. The participation constraint is in fact en-
dogenously determined in the present situation. On the one hand, the contract must
be acceptable for the agent from an ex-ante perspective (i.e., in expectation over all
levels of production costs). On the other hand, it must not be too unprofitable from
an ex-interim perspective (i.e., for each particular cost level) to rule out precontractual
investigation. Now, since investigation costs are due anyway for the agent if the sepa-
rating schedule will be implemented, a different randomization can result in a different
participation constraint. This effect is clearly not related to the role of stochastic con-
tracts as screening device in the standard case with exogenous information (see Maskin
and Riley, 1984 and Strausz, 2006). In equilibrium, any contractual randomization
resolves before the agent learns his type. Moreover, stochastic terms of trade cannot
improve screening in my model because all agent types have a linear utility function. In
different contexts (e.g., collective decision making), it has been noted as well that en-
dogenous information may provide a rationale for the use of stochastic mechanisms (see
Gerardi and Yariv, 2008, Gershkov and Szentes, 2009, and the survey by Bergemann
and Välimäki, 2006).
Various papers analyze profit-maximizing contracts for related scenarios with en-
dogenous information.6 A key insight is that the timing of information gathering and
contracting plays an important role (see Bergemann and Välimäki, 2006). In particu-
more than a quarter of the work had been changed after contracts were awarded and designs were
completed. Because of that, the [panel’s] report said, the way the district handles and manages
change orders was ‘fraught with waste and inefficiency and should be abandoned’ ” (Los Angeles Times,
January 12, 2012).
6The seminal paper of Bergemann and Välimäki (2002), on the other hand, is concerned with
endogenous information and the implementation of efficient outcomes. In their model, contract design
is not restricted by participation conditions.
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lar, Crémer et al. (1998b), Crémer and Khalil (1994) as well as Kessler (1998) consider
principal-agent relationships under the assumption that the agent can only acquire in-
formation before the contract is offered.7 It is thus impossible for the principal to affect
the agent’s decision with her contract proposal. In the seminal paper of Lewis and
Sappington (1997), the agent can only investigate the state between contract offer and
signing. However, my result does not apply since the principal wants to induce infor-
mation acquisition with certainty in their model. More closely related is the seminal
analysis of Crémer and Khalil (1992), where the agent can acquire information between
contract offer and signing but obtains it freely afterwards. Like in my model, infor-
mation gathering before signing is just a rent-seeking activity and is deterred by the
principal.8 Comparative statics show that the principal benefits from higher investi-
gation costs. Applied to reality, this insight suggests that she might have an interest
to conceal some details about the agent’s tasks before signing if uncertainty increases
investigation costs. In fact, stochastic contracts serve exactly this purpose in my model.
Finally, Crémer et al. (2009) as well as Krähmer and Strausz (2011) analyze the case
that information can only be collected after the contract is signed. Here, the princi-
pal does not need to make a trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction. This
scenario is thus most favorable for her.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
1.3 derives the main result, according to which stochastic contracts can outperform the
deterministic ones. Section 1.4 concludes. Most of the proofs and some auxiliary results
are relegated to Appendix A1. Appendix A2 shows the benefits of stochastic contracts
in a more general model.
7Crémer and Khalil (1994) and Crémer et al. (1998b) assume furthermore that the agent learns
his costs freely after signing if he decides against precontractual investigation.
8Compte and Jehiel (2008) qualify this finding of Crémer and Khalil (1992) and argue that if
several agents compete for the contract, the principal possibly induces precontractual investigation to
find an agent with appropriate skills.
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1.2 The model
I use a variant of the procurement model by Crémer et al. (1998a). Specifically, the
agent can produce an arbitrary quantity of a good which the principal wants to consume.
Given output q, marginal production costs β and transfer t, the agent’s payoff is t−βq.
The principal’s payoff is V (q)−t, where V is strictly concave, continuously differentiable
and satisfies V ′(0) =∞ and V ′(∞) = 0.
Marginal production costs are a random variable, whose realization is low (β = β)
with probability p ∈ (0, 1), or high (β = β), where 0 < β < β. (Appendix A2
demonstrates that the restriction to two levels of productions costs is not significant.)
I will sometimes refer to the agent in state β as the efficient type and in state β as
the inefficient type. Initially, both parties do not know which state obtains. However,
the agent can acquire information, which effectively allows him to learn the state at
investigation costs of γ > 0. Information acquisition is unobservable, and the agent’s
findings cannot be verified by the principal or any third party. If the agent does not
investigate, he will not learn his production costs during the interaction.
The principal has full bargaining power. At some initial date, she offers a contract to
specify the quantity q ≥ 0 to be delivered in exchange for a transfer t ∈ R, both possibly
contingent on arbitrary forms of communication. The principal can credibly commit to
obey her contractual obligations and to decline any renegotiation. If the agent accepts
the contract (i.e., if he signs it), its terms become binding for him; otherwise, the
relationship ends without trade.
An important property of the model is that the agent can acquire information either
after the contract is signed, or already before. This is the main difference to Crémer
et al. (1998a), where information acquisition is only possible between contract offer and
signing.9 Using their terminology, I will often refer to information acquisition before
signing as precontractual investigation.
In detail, the model has the following timing:
1. Principal offers contract, and nature selects production costs
9Beyond this, the two models only differ in that the agent’s type set is binary in the present model
whereas Crémer et al. (1998a) assume a continuum.
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2. Agent can acquire information
3. Agent accepts or rejects contract
4. If contract accepted: Agent can acquire information
If contract rejected: Relationship ends without trade
Efficiency.—From an efficiency perspective, the agent should bear the costs of in-
formation acquisition if and only if it holds that
E[max
q
V (q)− βq]− γ ≥ max
q
V (q)− E[β]q.
The inequality means that given efficient production (i.e., q∗ = V ′−1(β) for low costs,
q∗ = V ′−1(β) for high costs, and q∗ = V ′−1(E[β]) if costs remain unknown), surplus will
be larger if the agent investigates his type.10 Since information costs the same before
and after signing, the timing of information acquisition is irrelevant with respect to
surplus.
1.3 The analysis
I now study the contracting problem from the perspective of the principal, who wants
to maximize her payoff. Note that the agent is risk-neutral and not wealth-constrained.
If information could only be acquired after signing, these assumptions would imply
that the principal offers an efficient contract and appropriates the entire surplus.11 On
the other hand, if only precontractual investigation was possible, the principal would
generally have to make a trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction (see Crémer
et al., 1998a). The analysis will show that this trade-off is also present in a situation
where the agent can investigate his costs at either date. However, the principal has
more choice over outcomes with stochastic contracts, which might be more profitable.
10Throughout the chapter, efficient production means the output level which maximizes surplus
given what is known about production costs. An efficient contract implements efficient production
and the surplus-maximizing information acquisition decision.
11E.g., the sell-the-project contract, which lets the agent choose output and specifies the transfer
t(q) = −S + V (q), where S is equal to the maximum possible surplus, fulfills that purpose.
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1.3.1 Contracts
This section describes a class of tractable contracts to which the analysis may be re-
stricted. Before applying the revelation principle, it is convenient to rule out contracts
that induce precontractual investigation. According to Lemma 1.1, such contracts nei-
ther generate more surplus than other ones, nor allow to allocate the surplus differ-
ently.12
To prepare for this result, note that the contract offered by the principal generally
specifies some message game, in which the history of sent messages determines the
terms of trade. In fact, a larger game is played, which consists of the message game and
the agent’s decisions on information acquisition and signing. The two parties behave
in this game according to one of the sequential equilibria that maximize the principal’s
payoff.
Lemma 1.1. Suppose a contract implements an equilibrium in which, with some prob-
ability, the agent investigates his costs before signing. Then, there is a contract that
implements an equilibrium with identical payoffs in which the agent stays uninformed
before signing.
Proof. The alternative contract differs from the original one in two aspects. First, for
any history of the message game after which the agent might reject the original contract
in the considered equilibrium, it specifies that he gets the extra option of trading (t, q) =
(0, 0) if he accepts. The alternative contract thus implements an equilibrium with
identical payoffs in which the agent never rejects (and in which he chooses (t, q) = (0, 0)
after the histories where he rejected the original proposal). Second, it specifies that the
message game begins at date 4, so that the agent does not have to take any decision
before signing. The two differences imply that the alternative contract implements an
equilibrium with identical payoffs in which the agent never gathers information before
signing.
12The statement is reminiscent of Lemma 1 by Crémer and Khalil (1992), who consider the situation
where the agent learns his type at no cost after signing. In that setting, contracts which induce costly
precontractual investigation generate strictly less surplus than other ones and are strictly suboptimal.
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According to the revelation principle for multistage games (see Myerson, 1986),
the search for optimal contracts can be confined to direct, incentive-compatible and
individually rational contracts. Direct contracts are of the form
C = {α, (t, q), ((t, q), (t, q))}.
Communication begins after signing. First, the principal recommends with probability
α to acquire information and otherwise to stay uninformed. In the latter case, no
further communication takes place, and the agent has to deliver quantity q in exchange
for transfer t. In case the principal recommends information acquisition, the agent must
report his finding subsequently. If he reports low costs, he has to produce quantity q
and receives transfer t. If he reports high costs, on the other hand, t and q must be
exchanged. Such a contract is incentive-compatible if the agent finds it best to follow
the principal’s recommendation and to report truthfully on the equilibrium path. I
also require that it does not provide an incentive to investigate production costs before
signing. Finally, a contract is individually rational if the agent prefers to accept it
In the following, I will refer to (t, q) as the pooling schedule and to ((t, q), (t, q)) as
the separating schedule. Moreover, I call a contract stochastic if it stipulates α ∈ (0, 1)
and deterministic if α ∈ {0, 1}.
Remark 1.1. In general, direct contracts must also specify a recommendation as to
precontractual investigation. But Lemma 1.1 implies that the agent may always be
asked to stay uninformed before signing.
Remark 1.2. Tacitly, the focus has been restricted to contracts in which the delivered
quantity is a deterministic function of recommendation and report. This does not imply
a loss of generality. The agent is risk-neutral. Therefore, his behavior would not change
if q, q, and q were replaced by random variables as long as expected values remain
constant. But since V is concave, the principal prefers the quantity to be deterministic.
1.3.2 Principal’s problem
I now explain the trade-off that the principal must make to find an optimal contract.
In the formal description of her problem, U(α) = (1−α)(t−βq) +α(t−βq) and U(α),
which is defined analogously, are used to denote the agent’s payoff.
13
According to the previous section, the contract should satisfy the following condi-
tions. First, the agent must not gather information before signing:
pU(α) + (1− p)U(α)− αγ ≥ pmax{0, U(α)}+ (1− p) max{0, U(α)} − γ. (1.1)
Second, the contract has to be acceptable for the uninformed agent:
pU(α) + (1− p)U(α)− αγ ≥ 0. (1.2)
Third, the agent must follow the recommendation to stay uninformed. This condition
is automatically satisfied because information is worthless after signing when the prin-
cipal implements the pooling schedule. Fourth, the agent has to acquire information if
this is recommended by the principal. More precisely, it must be unprofitable to stay
uninformed and report high production costs:
pU(1) + (1− p)U(1)− γ ≥ U(1) + p(β − β)q (1.3)
or low costs:
pU(1) + (1− p)U(1)− γ ≥ U(1)− (1− p)(β − β)q. (1.4)
Finally, after having observed his type, the agent is to transmit his findings honestly.
In case of high costs, this requires:
U(1) ≥ U(1)− (β − β)q, (1.5)
while for low costs it must be:
U(1) ≥ U(1) + (β − β)q. (1.6)
Consider now the principal’s objective. Her payoff from a contract C that satisfies
the conditions listed above is
pi = (1− α){V (q)− t}+ α{p[V (q)− t] + (1− p)[V (q)− t]}.
Thus, the contracting problem reads
P : max
C
pi s.t. (1.1)–(1.6).
The following lemma suggests a more convenient representation of the contracting
problem.
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Lemma 1.2. For each contract that satisfies (1.1)–(1.6), there is a contract with iden-
tical payoffs that satisfies
(1− p)U(α) + (1− α)γ ≥ 0, (NIA)
U(α) + p(β − β)[(1− α)q + αq] ≥ 0, (IR)
(1− p)p(β − β)(q − q)− γ ≥ 0, (IA)
and
U(1)− U(1) = (β − β)q + γ
p
. (1.7)
Moreover, (NIA), (IR), (IA), and (1.7) imply (1.1)–(1.6).
Proof. Follows from Claims A1.1, A1.2, and A1.3 in Appendix A1.
Condition (1.7) can be inserted directly into the principal’s objective, which I now
formulate as the difference between the generated surplus and the agent’s payoff:
Π =(1− α){V (q)− E[β]q}+ α{−γ + p[V (q)− βq] + (1− p)[V (q)− βq]}
− U(α)− p(β − β)[(1− α)q + αq].
This allows me to restate the contracting problem as follows:
P : max
U(α),(q,q,q)≥0,α∈[0,1]
Π s.t. (NIA), (IR), (IA).
According to (IA), the information acquisition condition, reporting low costs obliges
the agent to produce extra output. By (1.7), on the other hand, the efficient type
receives extra payoff from the contract. These two conditions replace (1.3)–(1.6) to
make sure that the agent is obedient and honest if the principal recommends information
acquisition.13 Note that the requirements as to extra output and payoff—(IA) and
(1.7)—are stricter than in the familiar case with exogenous information, where the
13Two remarks are in order. First, both (IA) and (1.7) are information acquisition conditions. I
only do not use an explicit label for (1.7) because it immediately enters the objective function. Second,
the moral hazard constraints (1.3) and (1.4) directly imply the adverse selection conditions (1.5) and
(1.6), for they express that the agent is even willing to bear investigation costs to report correctly.
With more than two states of nature, eliciting his private information requires additional incentives
(see Appendix A2).
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agent is already informed from the outset (see Baron and Myerson, 1982). This is a
common feature of incentive contracts for situations with endogenous information.14
(IR) is the individual rationality constraint, which replaces (1.2). It accounts for
the fact that an agent with low production costs must necessarily earn more from any
contract.15 In the following, I call
U(α)− U(α) = (β − β)[(1− α)q + αq]
the efficient type’s rent. As (IR) is an ex-ante participation condition (the agent is
uninformed at signing), it does not rule out that the agent makes a loss if production
costs turn out to be high. However, any loss must be compensated by a sufficient rent
for the efficient type, so that the contract yields a positive payoff in expectation.
Finally, (NIA), the no information acquisition condition, replaces (1.1) to guarantee
that the agent does not investigate his costs before signing. Information is valuable to
the agent at signing if the contract is not profitable for him in the state with high pro-
duction costs. For if he knew his type, he could avoid a loss by refusing to participate.
On the other hand, information gathering is costly as well. But the agent anticipates
that investigation costs might be due anyway, namely if the principal will recommend
information acquisition after signing. In effect, the price of precontractual investiga-
tion is therefore only (1 − α)γ. To satisfy (NIA), it must be larger than the value of
information at signing.
The contracting problem involves the following trade-off. To maximize the total
surplus, the contract should require efficient production and information acquisition
either with probability α = 0 or α = 1, depending on the level of investigation costs.
To minimize the agent’s payoff, on the other hand, the principal can exploit the agent’s
initial ignorance regarding production costs. Specifically, she should extract the effi-
cient type’s rent with a signing-fee.16 Such a scheme satisfies the individual rationality
14See Lewis and Sappington (1997), who coined the term ‘super high-powered incentive scheme’,
and the general analysis of Szalay (2009).
15The extra payoff from the pooling schedule is U(0)−U(0) = (β − β)q. The extra payoff from the
separating schedule is specified by the incentive constraint (1.7).
16Put differently, the principal should choose U(α) = −p(β − β)[(1 − α)q + αq]. This loss can be
interpreted as a signing-fee incorporated in the transfers t, t and t.
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condition (IR), but it necessarily results in a loss for the inefficient type, who will not
obtain a rent. It is therefore not compatible with condition (NIA) if the principal rec-
ommends information acquisition with probability α = 1: precontractual investigation
would be valuable but effectively for free from the agent’s perspective. In fact, for α = 1
(NIA) turns into an ex-interim participation condition, which precludes signing-fees.
Extracting the rent might also be incompatible with (NIA) given α = 0—namely, if in-
vestigation costs are too low relative to the efficient output level.17 Thus, the principal
must generally make a trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction.
1.3.3 Benchmark
As a benchmark, it is instructive to review the contracting problem under the com-
mon assumption in the existing literature, according to which information can only be
gathered before signing. Given this assumption, my model is a special case of the one
studied by Crémer et al. (1998a). Their analysis shows that the principal may restrict
herself to the deterministic contracts and solve
Pdet : max
U(α),(q,q,q)≥0,α∈{0,1}
Π s.t. (NIA), (IR), (IA).
Intuitively, when the agent can only investigate the state before signing, he must also
know the principal’s recommendation at that date. Consequently, he makes his de-
cisions on precontractual investigation and signing after he learns the content of the
recommendation. Any schedule which is compatible with some stochastic contract can
therefore be implemented with a deterministic contract, too. The principal should thus
implement the best schedule with probability one. I want to find out whether she may
ignore stochastic contracts in the original model as well.
1.3.4 Use of stochastic contracts
This section contains the main result, according to which optimal contracts might be
stochastic. In the remaining analysis, I denote by W (α, γ) the principal’s payoff from
17Precisely, if it holds that γ < (1− p)p(β − β)q∗.
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one of the best contracts with a particular recommendation probability α ∈ [0, 1],
depending on the level of investigation costs.18
Because of intractability issues—with α as choice variable, P is not convex—I will
not derive the optimal contract but take the following approach to show that stochastic
contracts can improve over the deterministic ones. The key step is to identify circum-
stances where the principal can achieve more payoff with a stochastic contract than
with the corresponding lottery over deterministic contracts. After that step, I identify
circumstances where such a lottery is as profitable as each involved contract. This
procedure and continuity of the function W will establish the main result.
Lemma 1.3. There exists a cutoff γ1 such that it holds for any α ∈ (0, 1):
(1− α)W (0, γ) + αW (1, γ) < W (α, γ) if and only if γ > γ1.
Proof. See Claim A1.4 in Appendix A1.
Lemma 1.3 derives from the insight that, in principle, stochastic contracts allow to
appropriate the full surplus—not just the one from the pooling schedule. The basic idea
can be illustrated as follows. Let C0 and C1 be the best deterministic contracts that
induce information acquisition with probability zero and one, respectively. Furthermore,
let Cα be the stochastic contract which implements with probability α ∈ (0, 1) the
separating schedule from C1 and otherwise the pooling schedule from C0. Clearly,
the agent would comply with Cα, and the principal would earn as much as with the
corresponding lottery over the two deterministic contracts. The key observation which
helps to understand Lemma 1.3 is that Cα necessarily satisfies condition (IR) with
strict inequality. This is because C1 does not include a signing-fee. Now, since (IR)
is not binding for C1, the principal can find a better stochastic contract than Cα with
identical α if and only if (IR) is binding for C0. This translates into the condition
regarding investigation costs stated in the lemma.
18Such contracts exists, and the corresponding values U(α), (q, q, q) are unique: Given U(α), the
associated optimization program is convex and has a unique solution (q, q, q) due to the assumptions
on V . The resulting value function is decreasing in U(α), whose feasible set is closed and bounded
from below.
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Indeed, the benefit of stochastic contracts is due to a relaxed participation condition.
If there is a chance the agent will not be asked to investigate production costs after
signing, precontractual investigation comes at a price. As a consequence, the contract
does not have to be profitable for the agent from an ex-interim perspective. Stochastic
contracts can therefore implement outcomes that are not attainable with deterministic
contracts (see Claim A1.5 in Appendix A1 for details). In particular, the principal
may propose pooling and separating schedules which completely extract the generated
surplus. For low investigation costs, however, such schedules involve too inefficient
output levels, so that she does not use them.
The next step is to identify circumstances where a lottery over the two best deter-
ministic contracts is as profitable as each involved contract.
Lemma 1.4. The function W has the following properties:
1. There exists a unique intersection γ2 of W (0, ·) and W (1, ·).
2. W is continuous.
Proof. See Claims A1.6 and A1.7 in Appendix A1.
I can now state the main result, which is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 1.3
and 1.4.
Proposition 1.1. Suppose γ2 > γ1. Then, there exists an interval of investigation
costs containing γ2 in which optimal contracts are stochastic.
Proof. For any α ∈ (0, 1), it holds that W (0, γ2) = W (1, γ2) < W (α, γ2) by Lemmas
1.3 and 1.4. Since W is continuous according to Lemma 1.4, the inequality holds for a
whole interval of investigation costs containing γ2. Finally, continuity implies that an
optimal contract exists by Weierstrass’ theorem.
Proposition 1.1 essentially summarizes the preceding findings. If investigation costs
are close to γ2, the two best deterministic contracts roughly yield the same payoff
to the principal. If, in addition, γ > γ1 holds, stochastic contracts admit a more
favorable trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction than any of these ones.
Such circumstances are for instance possible if the probability of low production costs
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is large (see Claim A1.8 in Appendix A1). Intuitively, the principal must then pay out
rent with large probability and is therefore likely to benefit from a relaxed participation
constraint.
Example.—Suppose the primitives of the model are as follows:
V (q) =
√
q, β = 1, β = 5, p = 1
2
, γ = 0.0556.
For this setting, the following statements can be derived. The best contract with α = 0
is as profitable for the principal as the best contract with α = 1. Denote these two
contracts by C0 and C1. C0 requires efficient production (q = q∗) and extracts the rent
completely because (NIA) is slack. C1, on the other hand, resembles the familiar Baron-
Myerson contract.19 Since (NIA) represents an ex-interim participation condition, the
principal cannot extract the efficient type’s rent. As a consequence, C1 involves the
classical trade-off between rent extraction and surplus maximization, which manifests
in an inefficiently low output level q < q∗. For this contract, (IR) is slack. Consider
now contract C0.7, which implements with probability 0.7 the separating schedule from
C1 and otherwise the pooling schedule from C0. Clearly, this proposal is as profitable
for the principal as any of the two deterministic contracts. Moreover, it satisfies both
(NIA) and (IR) with strict inequality. The principal can thus obtain more payoff by
slightly increasing the signing-fee of C0.7. In fact, the agent would even comply with
contract C∗0.7, which stipulates α = 0.7, a signing-fee that extracts the rent completely,
and efficient production in all contingencies. It yields 9.3% more payoff for the principal
relative to any of the two best deterministic contracts.20
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter offers a new perspective on agency relationships with endogenous infor-
mation. If the agent can investigate his payoff from the contract either before or after
19(IA) does not bind. Consequently, the agent produces the same amount as in the case with
exogenous information. This reflects a finding of Crémer et al. (1998a), who show that if investigation
costs are sufficiently low, the principal need not adjust her demand to induce information acquisition.
20C∗0.7 may be suboptimal, too. As in the original model, the optimal contract is not obtained.
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signing, it is possible to reconcile full surplus extraction with incentives for informa-
tion acquisition. Appropriate contracts induce information acquisition randomly after
signing, so as to create uncertainty for the agent whether investigation costs will be
due.
Possibly, the principal need not resort to stochastic contracts in order to create this
uncertainty if she faces more than one agent. In that case, she can induce informa-
tion acquisition sequentially after signing until she meets an agent with appropriate
characteristics. (Crémer et al. (2009) argue that such a procedure is optimal in an
auction setting where bidders can investigate their valuations for the object after sign-
ing.) Clearly, the order according to which the agents are approached would affect the
likelihood that investigation costs will be due for a particular agent.
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Chapter 2
Precontractual Investigation and
Sequential Screening
Abstract. The possession of private, payoff-relevant information often confers bar-
gaining power. Should contract design induce its acquisition in the first place? Crémer
and Khalil (1992) conclude: Agents should not be encouraged to investigate param-
eters which they will learn anyway before the contract is implemented. This chapter
shows that imperfect investigation allows for more effective, sequential screening and
can actually benefit the principal.
2.1 Introduction
Crémer and Khalil (1992), henceforth CK, suggest an alternative notion of adverse
selection, according to which private information is not a priori given but acquired in
response to contract design.1 This approach begs the question of whether contract
design should spur information acquisition in the first place. CK address the issue from
the viewpoint of a profit-maximizing principal and conclude: Before entering into a
contract, an agent should never be encouraged to investigate some unknown, relevant
state of the world which he will learn anyway until the transaction takes place. The
present chapter shows that this result does typically not extend beyond the case in
1I use the term adverse selection in the sense of Hart and Holmstrom (1987), referring to situations
in which agents hold private, precontractual information.
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which investigation removes all uncertainty. Generally, investigation allows for more
effective, sequential screening of the agent’s private information.
The basic model by CK deals with bilateral trading.2 Initially, both parties do
not know the agent’s preferences over possible trade agreements. While deliberating
whether to accept a contract, the agent can spend resources to investigate the state. In
any case, he will fully discover its realization at some date when the contract has been
signed but not yet carried out. The agent’s preferences might of course be relevant for
the principal, too; after all, she decides about the terms of trade. But she does not have
the possibility to verify transmitted information. Also, she cannot observe whether the
agent conducts an investigation.
CK mention several applications in which this information structure naturally pre-
vails. One example is procurement of customized goods. Here, the contractor usually
does not know his operating costs before inspecting the designs but can make a forecast
based on experience from similar projects. Another possible interpretation of the model
is that the principal actively withholds some source of private information before sign-
ing and the agent can explore some other, less informative source which the principal
does not control. Prospective bidders for U.S. offshore oil and gas leases, for instance,
are not permitted to conduct on-site test drills in advance but can explore neighboring
tracts acquired in previous auctions (Hendricks and Porter, 1996).
From an efficiency perspective, investigation is clearly wasteful in this scenario. The
two parties should simply wait until the agent learns his preferences anyway and agree
then on the terms of trade. But since information will be distributed asymmetrically,
contracts which allocates all expected surplus to the principal must generally be un-
profitable for the agent in some states. Now, in effect, the possibility to probe the state
endows the agent with the costly option to explore his payoff in advance and avoid a
likely loss by refusing to participate. If information gathering entails low costs, the
principal must consequently make a trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction.
2They also study an extension where the principal faces several agents, for which they do not
formally reestablish the result. Compte and Jehiel (2008) argue that if several agents compete for a
single, bilateral contract, the principal possibly spurs investigation to find a suitable candidate.
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CK study the contracting problem under the assumption that investigation allows
to perfectly observe the prevailing state. Their analysis furthermore concentrates on
static screening mechanisms, in which the agent is to transmit his private information
all at once at some date when he knows his preferences with or without investigation.
It turns out that, under these conditions, the principal will never use a contract which
spurs the agent to observe the state in advance. Intuitively, her bargaining power is
larger if the agent does not dispose of private information at the contracting stage, and
the agent’s incentives to reveal his preferences are unaffected by this matter.
The present chapter demonstrates that information acquisition can in general mit-
igate the information revelation problem and, therefore, benefit the principal. To this
end, I extend the analysis of CK to imperfect investigations and arbitrary screening
mechanisms. In fact, static mechanisms are suboptimal if the agent conducts an imper-
fect investigation: the contract should oblige him to transmit his findings before he fully
learns the state. Such sequential protocols facilitate screening because the agent must
decide about deviations from truthful reporting when the exact gains thereof are still
uncertain. As a consequence, spurring imperfect, cheap investigations typically admits
a more favorable trade-off between efficiency and surplus extraction.
My analysis suggests that adverse selection with endogenous information in the spirit
of CK calls for a dynamic mechanism design perspective. In this respect, the chapter
contributes to the growing literature which explores scope and design of sequential
screening mechanisms in scenarios where agents gradually receive private information
over time.3 Most closely related within this literature is the seminal article on advanced
ticket sales by Courty and Li (2000). In their model, the consumer freely obtains private
information about his valuation for a ticket both before and after the contract has
been signed. Conceptually, the present framework adds a moral hazard issue to that
setting, as precontractual investigation entails costs and cannot be observed. A polar
scenario, with postcontractual investigation, has been analyzed by Krähmer and Strausz
(2011). There, the agent’s incentives to acquire information clearly differ since he cannot
3See, e.g., Baron and Besanko (1984), Battaglini (2005), Boleslavsky and Said (2013), Courty and
Li (2000), Dai et al. (2006), Esö and Szentes (2007), Krähmer and Strausz (2012, 2011), Riordan and
Sappington (1987), and the general analysis by Pavan et al. (2012).
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quit the contract afterwards. Relevant is finally recent work by Krähmer and Strausz
(2012). They show under general conditions that dynamic screening mechanisms cannot
improve over static ones if agents are protected by limited liability. According to my
analysis, a principal will then deter investigation.
Various papers study the design of profit-maximizing contracts in related scenarios
with precontractual investigation.4 The use of sequential screening mechanisms has
not been explored yet. Specifically, Crémer et al. (1998a), Kessler (1998), Lewis and
Sappington (1997), Shi (2012), and Szalay (2009) consider situations in which the agent
does not receive information once the contract has been signed. Crémer et al. (1998b),
Crémer and Khalil (1994), and Terstiege (2012), on the other hand, assume like CK
that precontractual investigation yields perfect information about the unknown state.
One of the literature’s key objectives is to examine comparative statics with respect
to investigation costs and timing. This chapter, in contrast, can be regarded as a
comparative static analysis with respect to the quality of precontractual investigation:
I show that a principal might only spur an imperfect investigation.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
2.3 briefly studies the first-best and reviews the findings by CK. Section 2.4 derives the
main result, according to which investigation can be desirable. Section 2.5 concludes.
All formal proofs are relegated to Appendix A3.
2.2 The model
I use a general version of the procurement model by CK. Specifically, the principal seeks
to purchase some good which the agent can produce. If the two parties agree to trade
output q ≥ 0 in exchange for transfer t ∈ R, the principal’s payoff is V (q) − t. The
agent’s payoff is t− βq, where β represents the marginal disutility of production. If no
agreement is reached, both parties get zero payoff.
The principal can offer a contract to fix the terms of trade (t, q). At the time of
4The seminal article by Bergemann and Välimäki (2002), in contrast, takes the perspective of a
surplus-maximizing principal. See Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) for a comprehensive survey of the
literature on mechanism design with endogenous information.
26
contracting, however, no party knows the marginal disutility of production. Formally, β
denotes the realization of a random variable, which is drawn from the set {β1, . . . , βn}.
Suppose n > 1 and let γi be the probability of realization βi. The agent learns the
value of β once the contract has been signed. Before signing, he can already acquire
information about the state, but at a cost of e ≥ 0. This act is not observable for the
principal.
The model differs from the one by CK in that it allows for imperfect investigation.
More precisely, I assume that information acquisition does not necessarily reveal the
disutility parameter β to the agent but only the probability distribution γ = (γi)ni=1—
which both parties do not know either. Formally, also γ denotes the realization of a
random variable, drawn from the set {γ1, . . . γm}. Suppose m > 1 and let pij > 0 be the
probability of realization γj. The probability distribution (pij)mj=1 is commonly known
at the outset.5 To distinguish the two possible pieces of private information, I call γ
the agent’s ex-ante type and β his ex-post type.
In detail, the timing of the model is as follows:
1. The principal offers a contract.
2. The agent can observe his ex-ante type γ at cost e.
3. The agent decides whether to accept (i.e., sign) the contract. If he accepts, stage
4 is reached. Otherwise, the relationship ends without trade.
4. The agent learns his ex-post type β.
Next, I state additional, technical assumptions. The function V , which determines
the principal’s valuation for output, is strictly concave, continuously differentiable, and
satisfies V ′(0) = ∞ and V ′(∞) = 0. The set of ex-post types, {β1, . . . , βn}, is ordered
0 < β1 < . . . < βn < ∞. The set of ex-ante types, {γ1, . . . , γm}, is ordered in terms
of first-order stochastic dominance. Specifically, for any two probability distributions
γj′ , γj′′ with j′ < j′′ it holds that
∑k
i=1 γij′ >
∑k
i=1 γij′′ for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Given these assumptions, investigation is perfect (i.e., reveals β) if and only if n = m
and γij = 1 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i = j. The analysis will mainly focus on the
5Hence, both parties start with the prior belief that β equals βi with probability
∑m
j=1 pijγij . If
the agent conducts an investigation, his findings allow him to update to the posterior belief γi.
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case that investigation is imperfect in the following, generic sense:
Condition 2.1. Each probability distribution γj ∈ {γ1, . . . , γm} has full support on the
set of ex-post types: γj ∈ (0, 1)n.
2.3 Benchmarks
In the next section, I study the contracting problem from the perspective of the princi-
pal, who wants to maximize her profit. My aim is to examine whether contract design
should provide incentives that induce the agent to acquire information. As benchmarks,
it is instructive to first study the first-best and review the insights by CK into the case
with perfect investigation.
First-best.—From an efficiency perspective, investigation is clearly wasteful. After
all, precise information about the marginal disutility of production becomes available
at no cost after signing. The two parties should consequently wait until the agent learns
his ex-post type anyway and then exchange q? = V ′−1(β).
Perfect investigation.—As shown by CK, a perfect investigation can never be in the
principal’s interest. Their analysis focuses on contracts of the form C = (tr, qr)r∈R.
After signing, at some date where he knows the value of β whether or not he acquired
information, the agent must select and submit a report r from some message set R. The
report obliges the parties to the terms of trade (tr, qr). Intuitively, with such contracts
the agent might just investigate in order to acquire a more favorable bargaining position:
being able to join the contract if and only if it is profitable given the true ex-ante type.
The principal does not encourage information gathering because she herself could sell
this option to the agent. Given any contract where an investigation pays off, she can for
instance add some report s to the message set, specify (ts, qs) = (0, 0), and charge a fee
of e for the upgrade. As ex-ante and ex-post type are equivalent in this benchmark case,
the modified contract replicates the outcome of the original one but deters information
gathering, and the fee transfers the former investigation expenses to the principal.
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2.4 The analysis
2.4.1 Contracts
I now return to the original model and argue that the principal might well ask the agent
to acquire information even though investigation is inefficient and improves the agent’s
bargaining position. An essential step towards this insight is to apply the revelation
principle for multistage games (Myerson, 1986), which allows to confine the search for
optimal contracts to the direct, incentive-compatible ones.
In the present situation, there are two sorts of direct contracts. I call them the
pooling and the separating contracts.6 Pooling contracts have the form CP = (ti, qi)i∈I .
Before signing, the principal recommends to not gather information. After signing,
she requests a report i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} about the ex-post type. The two parties
must then adopt the terms of trade (ti, qi). Separating contracts, on the other hand,
are denoted by CS = ((tij, qij)i∈Ij)j∈J . Before signing, the principal recommends the
agent to investigate his ex-ante type, which he must announce by sending a report
j ∈ J = {1, . . . ,m}. Importantly, the revelation principle demands that this report is
due before the agent learns the ex-post type. After signing, the principal requests a
second report i ∈ Ij = {i ∈ I : γij > 0}, this time about the ex-post type. Given some
sequence of announcements ij, the parties finally trade (tij, qij). A direct contract is
incentive-compatible if the agent prefers to follow the principal’s recommendation and
to send truthful reports on the equilibrium path.
Separating contracts fundamentally differ from the contracts described by CK in
that they use a sequential screening mechanism, rather than a static one. In particular,
the agent must select a report about the ex-ante type before learning the ex-post type.
One implication of this arrangement is that even contracts which the agent will accept
regardless of his findings can induce investigation, as information concerning the ex-ante
type might be relevant for choosing a report. In fact, a standard revealed-preferences
argument shows that the analysis of separating contracts may be restricted to such
6In fact, the pooling and separating contracts are the deterministic direct contracts. Standard
arguments show that this restriction does not entail a loss of generality. See Terstiege (2012) for
remarks on the use of stochastic contracts in agency relationships with endogenous information.
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individually rational proposals.7
Clearly, a perfect investigation cannot be desirable even with this general contract
space. If ex-ante and ex-post type are equivalent, the incentive-compatible, individ-
ually rational separating contracts implement outcomes (t˜i, q˜i)i∈I that, by revealed
preferences, are also implementable using pooling contracts. The principal can ac-
tually improve on every separating contract with the corresponding pooling contract
(t˜i − e, q˜i)i∈I , for the agent saves on investigation costs.
Henceforth, I assume that investigation is imperfect in the sense of Condition 2.1.
This simplifies the configuration of separating contracts, as the message sets Ij from
which the agent picks the report about the ex-post type do then not depend on his
report regarding the ex-ante type. More precisely, Condition 2.1 implies Ij = I for all
j ∈ J . As a consequence, it will be possible to pin down the agent’s reporting strategy
with separating contracts off the equilibrium path.8
2.4.2 Principal’s problem
According to the previous section, the principal’s problem is to find an optimal contract
among the pooling and separating ones. This section provides a formal description of
the problem, using the notation Ui = ti−βiqi and Uij = tij−βiqij for the agent’s payoff.
To deter investigation, the principal should offer a pooling contract that satisfies
the following constraints. First, the agent must reveal the ex-post type after signing:
Ui ≥ Uk + (βk − βi)qk ∀i, k ∈ I. (P1)
Second, he should be willing to accept the contract:
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijUi
]
≥ 0. (P2)
7If an agent with ex-ante type γj rejects a given incentive-compatible contract C˜S , he would accept
a contract ĈS that only differs in that (t̂ij , q̂ij)∈Ij = (0, 0). ĈS is incentive-compatible, too, and hence
replicates the outcome of C˜S .
8Condition 2.1 is very common in the sequential screening literature (see, e.g., Courty and Li, 2000,
Battaglini, 2005, Esö and Szentes, 2007, and Krähmer and Strausz, 2011). See Krähmer and Strausz
(2008) for a model with shifting supports.
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Finally, the agent must not conduct an investigation:
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijUi
]
≥
m∑
j=1
pij max
{
n∑
i=1
γijUi, 0
}
− e. (P3)
Consider now the principal’s objective. By definition, her payoff equals the difference
between the generated surplus and the agent’s payoff. Formally, the best pooling con-
tracts are therefore the solutions to
PP : max
CP
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γij[V (qi)− βiqi − Ui]
]
s.t. (P1)–(P3).
Next, I turn to the relevant contracts to induce investigation, the separating ones.
They should satisfy the following constraints. First, the agent needs an incentive to
reveal his ex-post type after signing. Given Condition 2.1, this requires
Uij ≥ Ukj + (βk − βi)qkj ∀i, k ∈ I. (S1)
Second, he must honestly report the ex-ante type. Note that even though truth-telling
is not required off the equilibrium path, (S1)—by Condition 2.1—ensures that the agent
will reveal his ex-post type if he was dishonest before. Hence, the constraint reads:
n∑
i=1
γijUij ≥
n∑
i=1
γijUil ∀j, l ∈ J. (S2)
Third, the contract has to be acceptable for the agent:
n∑
i=1
γijUij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J. (S3)
A separating contract must finally induce information gathering:
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijUij
]
− e ≥ max
{
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijUil
]
, 0
}
∀l ∈ J. (S4)
Given these constraints, the best separating contracts are the solutions to
PS : max
CS
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γij[V (qij)− βiqij − e− Uij]
]
s.t. (S1)–(S4).
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2.4.3 Comparison
Before continuing with the analysis, it is helpful to compare the pooling and separating
contracts in light of the insights from the study of the benchmarks.
Bargaining position.—(P2) and (P3) describe the agent’s bargaining position with
pooling contracts. In principle, the agent will accept any proposal that guarantees non-
negative payoff in expectation over all ex-ante types. On the other hand, he has the
costly option to check his ex-ante type in advance and avoid a loss by refusing to par-
ticipate. This option serves as a threat to the principal. Relative to investigation costs,
her proposal must not be too unprofitable for particular ex-ante types. The agent’s bar-
gaining position with separating contracts is in general stronger, as he is supposed to
know the type at signing. Specifically, to ensure the agent’s participation the principal
must guarantee non-negative payoff for each particular ex-ante type (see (S3)). Only
with zero investigation costs, the bargaining position does not differ between pooling
and separating contracts.
Incentives to investigate.—If being offered a pooling contract, the agent might only
gather information with respect to the decision whether to accept the proposal (see
(P3)). This is because pooling contracts use the same, static screening mechanism as
the contracts described by CK. An individually rational separating contract, on the
other hand, will induce investigation if and only if information about the ex-ante type
is sufficiently valuable for the agent with respect to the selection of the first report
(see (S4)). Thus, the principal must generally differentiate the terms of trade among
the possible ex-ante types to spur investigation. Only with zero investigation costs,
differentiation is not required.
Efficiency potential.—Pooling contracts can generate the first-best surplus (e.g.,
let (ti, qi)i∈I = (V (q?i ), q?i )i∈I). Incentive-compatible, individually rational separating
contracts are generally inferior in this respect: First, the agent bears investigation costs.
Second, the principal must differentiate the terms of trade among the possible ex-ante
types to spur investigation. Only with zero investigation costs, separating contracts
can generate the first-best surplus as well.
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2.4.4 Problem with pooling contracts
I now explain why the principal might want to spur investigation. This step requires
a more transparent representation of the best pooling contracts, using the notation
Γkj =
∑k
i=1 γij for the cumulative probability distribution corresponding to type γj.
Lemma 2.1. For each pooling contract that satisfies (P1)–(P3), there is a pooling
contract with identical expected payoffs that satisfies
Ui − Ui+1 = (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, (2.1)
qi − qi+1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, (2.2)
m∑
j=1
pj
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
≥ 0, (2.3)
m∑
j=l
pj
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
+ e ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. (2.4)
Moreover, (2.1)–(2.4) imply (P1)–(P3).
Proof. Follows from Claims A3.1–A3.3 in Appendix A3.
Condition (2.1) can be inserted directly into the objective function of program PP :
ΠP =
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γij[V (qi)− βiqi]
]
−
[
m∑
j=1
pij
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]]
.
This allows me to represent the best pooling contracts as the solutions to
P˜P : max
Un, (qi)ni=1
ΠP s.t. (2.2)–(2.4).
By (2.1), the agent receives rent for not exaggerating the disutility of production.
According to (2.2), on the other hand, reporting less disutility obliges him to produce
more output. These two, standard constraints make sure that the agent is honest
when the principal asks for the ex-post type. (2.3) guarantees the agent non-negative
payoff in expectation over all ex-ante types, so that he is willing to participate. The
final constraint rules out investigation. As pointed out in section 2.4.3, information
about the ex-ante type is valuable to the agent with pooling contracts if and only if
the proposal is unprofitable for some types. (2.4) requires the value of information to
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be less than the level of investigation costs, taking the first-order stochastic dominance
ranking into account. Namely, the ranking implies that the agent can expect a larger
payoff the lower the ex-ante type, for he will earn more rent the lower the ex-post type,
in turn.
Pooling contracts involve the following problem. To maximize surplus, the proposal
should stipulate the efficient output schedule (q?i )ni=1. To minimize the agent’s payoff,
on the other hand, the principal can take advantage of the agent’s initial ignorance
regarding the disutility of production. Specifically, she should appropriate the expected
rent with a signing-fee.9 Such a scheme satisfies the participation constraint, (2.3), but
it necessarily results in an expected loss for high ex-ante types, which are likely to earn
little rent from any contract. The agent would therefore want to know his type. If
investigation costs are low, condition (2.4) thus forces the principal to make a trade-off
between efficiency and surplus extraction, and offering a pooling contract might actually
be suboptimal.
2.4.5 Use of separating contracts
This section establishes the main result, according to which the principal offers a sepa-
rating contract and thus induces information gathering if investigation entails low costs
and is imperfect in the sense of Condition 2.1. In the remaining analysis, W P (e) and
W S(e) denote the principal’s payoff from the best pooling and separating contracts,
respectively, depending on the level of investigation costs.10
According to the comparison in section 2.4.3, the drawbacks of separating contracts
are negligible with low investigation costs. With zero costs, in particular, the agent
virtually knows the prevailing ex-ante type at the outset, so that his bargaining position
as well as the efficiency potential do not differ relative to pooling contracts. Indeed,
separating contracts give the principal more choice over outcomes in that case, for they
admit—but not require—to differentiate the terms of trade among the possible ex-ante
9That is, she should choose Un = −[
∑m
j=1 pij [
∑n−1
i=1 Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1]], which can be interpreted
as a signing-fee incorporated into transfers.
10Claim A3.4 in Appendix A3 confirms the existence of such contracts.
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types. Hence, if investigation entails zero costs, offering a separating contract is at least
not suboptimal. Lemma 2.2 makes these arguments precise.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose Condition 2.1 is satisfied. Then, it holds that:
1. W P is non-decreasing and W S non-increasing.
2. W P and W S are continuous.
3. There exists a unique intersection e of W P and W S .
Proof. See Claims A3.5, A3.7, and A3.8 in Appendix A3.
By Lemma 2.2, the main result will be established if and only if separating contracts
can outperform the pooling ones in the case with zero investigation costs. The following
lemma therefore constitutes the final step of the analysis.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose Condition 2.1 is satisfied. Then, it holds that W S(0) > W P (0).
Remark 2.1. Given e = 0, the contracting problem is equivalent to the one considered
in the sequential screening literature (e.g., Courty and Li, 2000), where the agent is
assumed to know the ex-ante type at the outset. That literature typically imposes
stringent regularity conditions on the probability distributions γj which allow to fully
characterize optimal contracts.11 I do not follow this approach, as such conditions would
not be generic with imperfect investigation. The proof just verifies the key property:
optimal contracts have a sequential screening mechanism, rather than a static one.
Proof. See Claim A3.9 in Appendix A3.
Lemma 2.3 derives from the observation that, in effect, the ex-ante type determines
the agent’s marginal rate of substitution between rent and signing-fee with pooling
contracts.12 The idea can be explained as follows. Suppose γ ∈ {γ1, γ2} and β ∈
{β1, β2}. Moreover, assume zero investigation costs, so that the agent virtually knows
11See Battaglini and Lamba (2012) for a comprehensive account. The analytical problem with
sequential screening which necessitates the regularity conditions is that truth-telling constraints of the
form of (S2) commonly lack a useful characterization.
12Precisely, to each ex-ante type γj corresponds a whole vector Γj = (Γ1j , . . . ,Γn−1j) of marginal
rates of substitution. Γij is the marginal rate of substitution between fee and rent (βi− βi+1)qi+1. By
the first-order stochastic dominance ranking, it holds that Γj > Γj+1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
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the ex-ante type. Under these conditions, the trade-off with pooling contracts manifests
itself in an inefficiently low output level q2 < q∗2. The crucial insight is that the terms
of trade should never be distorted for both ex-ante types in this fashion: If γ1 prevails
the agent has a larger valuation for additional rent, because he is more optimistic to
receive it. Hence, if this type was to produce efficiently and pay a signing-fee that
fully extracts the additional surplus, both types would comply. Such a scheme amounts
to a separating contract that outperforms all pooling ones. The proof extends this
reasoning to the case with an arbitrary number of types, showing that for every proposal
among the best pooling contracts there exists a separating contract which exhibits ’no
distortion at the top’ and is more profitable.
The main result is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose Condition 2.1 is satisfied. Then, there exists a cutoff e > 0
such that optimal contracts are pooling contracts if and only if if e > e.
The benefit of separating contracts is basically due to a relaxed truth-telling con-
straint. With both classes of contracts, honesty must yield the agent at least the same
payoff as the best deviation strategy. This requirement is less demanding for separating
contracts because they force the agent to decide about deviations from truthful report-
ing before he learns the exact disutility parameter. Ultimately, he might not be able to
obtain those terms of trade in the proposal which are most profitable to him given his
true preferences. This advantage vanishes if investigation removes all uncertainty.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter revisits the adverse selection model proposed by Crémer and Khalil (1992)
and shows that the principal provides incentives for information gathering if and only
if she benefits from sequential screening. Accordingly, separating contracts feature
different (namely, dynamic) screening mechanisms than the pooling ones. The analysis
demonstrates that separating contracts are typically advantageous if investigation costs
are low unless the agent has the possibility to acquire perfect information about his
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preferences. This is because, with imperfect investigation, the principal can exploit the
fact that sequential screening involves choice under uncertainty for the agent.
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Chapter 3
Objective versus Subjective
Performance Evaluations
Abstract. Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective
performance evaluations? After all, subjective evaluations entail a credibility issue.
While the most plausible explanation for this practice is lack of adequate objective
measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might also be used to withhold information
from the worker. I furthermore argue that withholding information is particularly
important under circumstances where the credibility issue is small. The statements
are derived from a two-stage principal-agent model in which the stochastic relationship
between effort and performance is unknown.
3.1 Introduction
Many employers try to boost employee morale by relating compensation—pay, career,
power, etc.—to performance. This chapter examines how a worker’s performance should
be measured. One possibility is to establish in advance a comprehensible, visible eval-
uation procedure that disregards expertise of biased persons (objective evaluation).
Alternatively, performance can be rated by the personal impression of the worker’s
supervisor, which is unverifiable (subjective evaluation). As an example, consider the
evaluation of a project manager’s work. His principal could either require initially
specified, non-manipulable tests that determine the project’s success at each stage until
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completion, or she may decide herself whether expectations are met.
If an employee’s compensation depends on subjective performance evaluations, it
is at the discretion of his supervisor. Honest evaluations come at a cost. An owner-
manager, for instance, who would generally be tempted to understate performance and
save on labor costs, might be forced to acquire credibility through obligatory bonus pools
(paid out to some third party in case of negative evaluation, e.g., to charity) or up-or-
out career systems (employee lost in case of negative evaluation).1,2 If compensation
depends on an objective evaluation, on the other hand, it is court-enforceable, and the
employer does not incur such costs. Yet, subjective evaluations are common practice.3
The most plausible explanation of this fact holds that employers use subjective
performance measures to obtain more accurate evaluations of their workers. More
precisely, they complement objective measures which do not capture all tasks that are
to be carried out or which are subject to influences beyond the agent’s control. For if
the evaluation is incomplete, the agent might ‘game’ the incentive contract and neglect
tasks that are not included in the evaluation.4 In fact, empirical studies document that
1The same problem occurs with an employed manager if his interests are aligned with the owner’s
objectives. E.g., “the NSPS [a former pay system at the U.S. Department of Defense that involved
subjective evaluations] has been roundly criticized by staff members and union leaders who say sub-
jective performance evaluations could be used to limit pay. The review panel heard many complaints
that supervisors were pressured not to give too many employees a rating of 4, out of 5, apparently
because money was not available” (Washington Post, July 17, 2009).
2Supervisors can also be be tempted to overstate performance so as not to disgruntle employees
or when they are susceptible to bribery or currying favor by employees. See Prendergast (1999) for a
discussion. Finally, discretion over compensation allows supervisors to discriminate workers based on
sex, nationality, etc.
3Due to the availability of data, most studies on performance reviews consider CEO compensation.
E.g., Bushman et al. (1996) found that in 190 of 248 firms in the USA bonuses were (at least partly) at
the discretion of the board of directors. Murphy and Oyer (2003) examined 280 firms in the USA; 43%
displayed discretion in determining the size of bonus pools and 67% in allocating a bonus pool across
participants. Gibbs et al. (2004), who surveyed car dealerships in the USA, report that subjective
evaluations are also prevalent below CEO level.
4See Baker et al. (1994), Prendergast (1999), and the general analysis by Bernheim and Whinston
(1998). This argument draws on the multi-tasking problem described by Baker (1992) and Holmstrom
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subjective evaluations are more likely in jobs which comprise many tasks (see Brown,
1990 and MacLeod and Parent, 1999). If the evaluation is noisy, on the other hand, a
risk-averse agent might not respond to incentive pay.5
However, sometimes employers seem to conduct subjective evaluations not out of
necessity, as this theory suggests, but instead to eschew to establish comprehensive
objective performance measures. The following list provides some examples:
• In 2003, the National Research Council (NRC), a think tank, examined the qual-
ity of project management within the U.S. Department of Energy. It stated a
“lack of objective measures that makes it difficult to assess progress in improving
project management”, and “to build confidence within [...] Congress [...] and the
public in the department’s ability to manage the money it spends on its projects.
Evidence continues to be anecdotal rather than objective, quantitative, and ver-
ifiable” (National Research Council, 2003, pp. 31–32). A subsequent report by
the NRC suggested a number of appropriate measures (see National Research
Council, 2005).
• A study on 17 U.S. investment banks revealed that employees in sales and trading
divisions receive bonuses that largely depend on subjective performance appraisals
despite “the ease with which the profitability of an individual trader can be mea-
sured each day” (Eccles and Crane, 1988, p. 170). All 17 banks had implemented
bonus pools.
• The standards for associates to become partner at professional service firms are
usually highly intransparent although many explicit performance measures are
conceivable (see Gilson and Mnookin, 1989). (According to Morris and Pinnington
(1998), who surveyed law firms in the UK, the most important promotion criteria
are: getting new business, fee-earning ability, technical skill, and getting on with
clients.) At such organizations, up-or-out career systems are commonplace.
and Milgrom (1991) . E.g., as Bushman et al. (1996) note, a CEO has to plan the long-term strategy of
the company. If it is concealed from the financial market, his performance should not only be measured
with the stock price.
5See Rajan and Reichelstein (2009). This argument draws on the informativeness principle, estab-
lished by Harris and Raviv (1979) and Holmstrom (1979) .
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I suggest a complementary explanation, according to which subjectivity itself can be a
desirable property of a performance measure. It builds on the assumption that eval-
uations generate information and that only subjective evaluations generate exclusive
information, which can be concealed for some time.6 My analysis applies to jobs with
many tasks that are carried out sequentially (e.g., phases of project management) and,
more generally, to long-term employment relationships in which performance can be
assessed over time (e.g., after trading days or fiscal years until promotion decision). In
a nutshell, subjective evaluations at early stages of such jobs are advantageous for the
principal if details like productivity or ability are highly uncertain and can be inferred
from performance.7 This is because the worker could manipulate the incentive scheme
if he learned about these details too soon and because the cost entailed by the use of
subjective evaluations is actually low.
I derive my statements from a two-stage principal-agent model with hidden actions.
Specifically, in each stage the wealth-constrained agent can exert effort to increase the
likelihood of good performance in that stage, but effort is not observable. The principal
can use incentive pay for profit maximization. Three further assumptions are important.
First, the likelihood of good performance does not only depend on effort but also on an
unknown, persistent parameter. Second, the principal wants the agent to work hard in
each stage. Third, only the principal can evaluate performance. The third assumption
is of course an extreme simplification. In many employment relationships, the worker
has some idea about the produced output. Nevertheless, a comprehensive performance
measure might require certain data that are not easily accessible to him (e.g., test
results, sales numbers, or comparisons with other workers). I show that the assumption
can be rephrased accordingly without affecting the qualitative results.
With this model, I compare the principal’s profit in two scenarios that differ as
to how she evaluates performance. In the objective scenario, the principal evaluates
6Put differently, concealed evaluations are often inherently susceptible to manipulation and can
become unverifiable over time (i.e., equivalent to subjective evaluations).
7Early studies on evaluation practices by Govindarajan (1984) and Keeley (1977) indeed document
significant positive correlation between the use of subjective evaluations and uncertainty about success
on the job.
42
objectively in both stages. This means that it becomes public information at the end
of each stage whether the agent was successful. In the subjective scenario, the principal
evaluates subjectively in stage 1 and objectively in stage 2. Here, only she herself learns
the outcome of stage 1, and it cannot be verified.8
The analysis yields that, in each scenario, the principal incurs incentive costs. In
the objective scenario, contracts must take into account that the evaluation in stage 1
provides information about the unknown parameter and that the agent is in a better
position to draw inference since he privately knows his effort choice. In particular,
bad performance in stage 1 indicates an unfavorable state and thus calls for amplified
incentive pay in stage 2. But this scheme must not tempt the agent to produce a
failure on purpose. Therefore, the principal provides the same high-powered incentive
also when stage 1 was successful. As a consequence, the agent can secure rent. In the
subjective scenario, on the other hand, the principal optimally reveals her subjective
evaluation of stage 1 only after stage 2, and only after particular histories. Incentive pay
remains invariant over time, and the agent does not earn rent. However, the principal’s
discretion in determining the agent’s performance bonus for stage 1 implies a credibility
issue: ex post, the principal will always submit an evaluation which minimizes labor
costs. She must therefore commit to pay the bonus regardless of the content of her
evaluation—to the agent if he was successful and otherwise to a budget breaker. Hence,
the use of subjective evaluations entails a cost as well, namely the payoff to the budget
breaker.
I show that greater uncertainty about the stochastic relationship between effort and
performance renders the subjective scenario advantageous from the principal’s perspec-
tive. Intuitively, this result can be explained as follows. The model captures greater
uncertainty in form of more extreme posteriors about the unknown parameter. In par-
ticular, failure in stage 1 results in a more pessimistic posterior, so that the rent in
the objective scenario increases. In the subjective scenario, in contrast, the principal
benefits from more extreme posteriors. This is because she optimally rewards the agent
8This notion of objective and subjective evaluations is consistent with the recent literature (e.g.,
Murphy and Oyer, 2003). Earlier papers considered subjective evaluations as being unverifiable but
not necessarily private; see MacLeod (2003) and Fuchs (2007) for a discussion.
43
according to a wage scheme that, in fact, only requires the subjective evaluation if the
agent performs well in stage 2 (otherwise, there will be no bonus for stage 1). Now,
this event becomes less likely with a negative but more likely with a positive evaluation
if stage 1 gets more informative. Accordingly, the principal is less likely to submit a
bad rating and pay the bonus to the budget breaker. Moreover, the bonus itself can
be reduced, for the agent will be more confident to earn it. Both lowers the budget
breaker’s payoff, the cost to overcome the principal’s credibility issue.
Related literature
Most closely related is recent work on interim performance feedback during long-term
relationships by Chen and Chiu (2012). They consider a similar two-stage principal-
agent model in which the outcome of stage 1 can also be evaluated either objectively
or subjectively. The paper examines whether an interim evaluation of either kind is
desirable at all.9 As the model does not assume ex-ante uncertainty about the stochastic
relationship between effort and performance, the insights differ from my analysis.
According to this chapter, employers might establish subjective performance mea-
sures to withhold information from their workers and objective measures if verifiability
is the major concern. Several papers indicate similar pros and cons of subjective and ob-
jective evaluations but do not explore the trade-off. Closely related are recent papers by
Bashkar (2012), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2011), and Kwon (2012), who study dynamic
moral hazard problems in which performance is publicly observed. As in my model,
both the principal and the agent do not know the stochastic relationship between effort
and output and learn about it from past performance. The papers show that incentive
pay involves extra costs for the principal since just the agent knows past effort.10 It is
not examined whether the principal would gain from subjective evaluations.
Related is also the analysis by Lizzeri et al. (2002), who consider a dynamic moral
9In contrast to my model, pay can be made performance-contingent without interim evaluation as
the agent’s effort levels in the two stages are complements with respect to the outcome of stage 2.
10Crémer (1995), Hirao (1993), and Manso (2011) consider similar settings in which the principal
avoids the extra costs by either terminating the employment relationship or implementing a different
technology after failure.
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hazard problem in which the principal privately observes the agent’s performance.11
They find that the principal should better not reveal the agent’s interim performance
before the job is finished since she would otherwise have to pay more rent for the same
effort provision. (Different from my model, an interim evaluation does not have any
relevant informational content but only determines the agent’s continuation payoff. If
it is concealed, more effective carrot-and-stick schemes are possible.) However, the
principal can verify her evaluation (i.e., it is not subjective).
Incentive contracts with subjective performance measures are studied in the seminal
papers by Fuchs (2007), Levin (2003), and MacLeod (2003). They consider situations
in which the principal does not benefit from private instead of public information about
performance but has no means to evaluate objectively. It is analyzed in detail how lack
of verifiability exacerbates the contracting problem. Among these papers, Fuchs (2007)
is most closely related to the present study. He also investigates a finitely repeated moral
hazard problem and argues that subjective evaluations should only be revealed after the
last stage. (As with Lizzeri et al. (2002), evaluations do not have relevant informational
content in his model. If the agent is kept uninformed about his continuation payoff,
incentive pay involves more compressed wages, so that the truth-telling constraints for
the principal are less severe.)
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
3.3 first derives the best contract for the objective and the subjective scenario, re-
spectively. Afterwards, the two scenarios are compared with respect to the principal’s
profit, and it is shown that more uncertainty renders the subjective scenario advanta-
geous. Section 3.4 concludes. Lengthy proofs are relegated to Appendix A4. Appendix
A5 demonstrates the benefits of subjective evaluations in a more general model.
3.2 The model
A principal in need for a project manager is matched to an agent. The quality of the
match is determined by a random variable, whose distribution function is denoted by
11For more recent references in this strand of literature see footnote 19.
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F and whose realization θ lies in the interval [0, 1]. Both parties do not know which
state obtains.
Project management consists of two stages, and the final return to the principal
depends on the agent’s performance in each stage. In stage 1, the agent can exert effort
e1 ∈ {0, 1} at costs e1c, where c > 0. The agent’s effort provision is unobservable.
However, the principal can collect relevant data and conduct a performance evaluation.
I distinguish two scenarios, which differ as to the evaluation mode. In the objective
scenario, an objective evaluation takes place. This means that performance is verifiable
and commonly observed at the end of stage 1. In the subjective scenario, performance
is not verifiable and privately observed by the principal at the end of the stage.12 The
relationship between effort and performance does not depend on the evaluation mode.
Formally, performance is good (x1 = 1) with probability e1θ and bad (x1 = 0) with
probability 1− e1θ.
In stage 2, the agent exerts effort e2 ∈ {0, 1} and incurs costs e2c. Again, the
principal cannot monitor whether the agent shirks. In both scenarios, the agent’s
performance in stage 2 is objectively evaluated.13 It is again either good (x2 = 1)
or bad (x2 = 0); the good outcome obtains with probability e2θ. After stage 2, the
project yields the principal an unobservable, unverifiable return of ρ(x1, x2). I normalize
ρ(0, 0) = 0 and assume ρ(1, x2)− ρ(0, x2) = ρ(x1, 1)− ρ(x1, 0) = R > 0.
Both parties are risk neutral, do not discount future payoffs, and have an outside
option of zero. At the outset, the principal offers a contract to specify the agent’s wage.
It may be contingent on any verifiable data, possibly involving messages. The agent
does not dispose of own resources, so that only non-negative wages are feasible. If the
contract requires a budget breaker, a third party is available. All payments are made
after stage 2.
In detail, the model has the following timing:
0. Match quality θ realizes, and the principal offers a contract.
12Appendix A5 shows that the qualitative results also hold if the agent observes a noisy performance
signal.
13I implicitly regard the evaluation mode as one of the principal’s choice variables. The analysis
will make clear that it is advantageous to evaluate objectively in stage 2.
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1. Stage 1: The agent exerts effort e1. Then, performance x1 realizes. In the objec-
tive scenario, x1 is commonly observed. In the subjective scenario, x1 is privately
observed by the principal.
2. Stage 2: The agent exerts effort e2. Then, performance x2 realizes. In both
scenarios, x2 is commonly observed. Finally, payments are made.
The agent’s performance in stage 1 conveys information about the unknown quality
of the match, which can be used to update the initial expectation µ = E[θ]. However,
one has to take the agent’s effort decision in stage 1 into account to interpret this
information. If the agent exerted effort (e1 = 1), the posterior expectation of match
quality is either µ1 (in case x1 = 1) or µ0 (in case x1 = 0). Henceforth, I assume
1 > µ1 > µ > µ0 > 0.14 If the agent was lazy (e1 = 0), his performance is bad
regardless of the quality of the match, so that no information is conveyed and the
posterior expectation remains µ. An important property of the model is that the two
parties might have to base their posteriors on imperfect information: In both scenarios,
the principal does not observe e1. The agent, on the other hand, does not observe x1
in the subjective scenario.
In the next section, I compare the two scenarios with respect to the principal’s
profit. As usual, the analysis involves a two-step procedure to derive optimal contracts.
The first step is to assign to each effort plan a contract that implements it as cheaply
as possible. The second step is to identify among these contracts a profit-maximizing
one. Let (e1, e2) denote a deterministic effort plan that specifies the same effort level
for stage 2 after all possible histories up to that stage. To concentrate the analysis on
the relevant circumstances, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. In both scenarios, the principal wants to implement effort plan (1, 1).
Claim A4.1 in Appendix A4 shows that the assumption holds if R, the principal’s
return from success in some stage, is sufficiently large.15 Note that Assumption 3.1
14Precisely, µ =
∫ 1
0
θdF , µ1 = (1/µ)
∫ 1
0
θ2dF , and µ0 = [1/(1 − µ)]
∫ 1
0
θ(1 − θ)dF . The prescribed
ordering holds for instance if F is discrete and assigns positive probability to at least three distinct
realizations, or if F has a density that is supported on some non-degenerate subinterval of [0, 1].
15I only take deterministic effort plans (e1, e2(x1)) into account.
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in particular implies that the principal does not want to make e2 contingent on the
agent’s past performance. However, the evaluation in stage 1 will be required to create
incentives. I want to find out whether subjective or objective evaluations are more
appropriate.
3.3 The analysis
In each stage, performance is bad for sure if the agent shirks.16 If the model did not
involve uncertainty about the quality of the match, this condition would imply that
in the objective scenario the principal could appropriate the entire surplus.17 In case
the principal resorts to a subjective evaluation, on the other hand, incentive contracts
typically distribute some surplus to a budget breaker to confer credibility (see, e.g.,
MacLeod, 2003). Hence, the principal would clearly prefer the objective scenario if the
quality of the match was certain. The analysis will show that this ranking might be
reversed under uncertainty.
3.3.1 Objective scenario
In the objective scenario, the agent’s performance is objectively evaluated in both
stages. Optimal contracts neither involve communication nor a budget breaker but
consist of a performance-contingent wage scheme.
Let w = (wx1x2)x1,x2∈{0,1} be a wage scheme. To implement effort plan (1, 1), it must
satisfy four incentive-compatibility constraints. First, the agent has to exert effort in
stage 2 if he was successful in stage 1:
µ1w11 + (1− µ1)w10 − c ≥ w10. (3.1)
Second, he must also work hard if his performance was bad in stage 1, holding the
16This assumption is to rule out the standard ‘limited liability rent’, which would be due in both
scenarios. If anything, the assumption should favor the objective scenario, where the agent’s incentive
constraints are more pressing since the principal cannot withhold the evaluation of stage 1.
17If match quality was known to be p, for instance, the principal could achieve this by paying c/p
to the agent if he is successful in stage 1 and 2, respectively.
48
pessimistic posterior µ0:
µ0w01 + (1− µ0)w00 − c ≥ w00. (3.2)
Third, the agent must exert effort in stage 1 given that he will do so in stage 2:
µ[µ1w11+(1−µ1)w10−c]+(1−µ)[µ0w01+(1−µ0)w00−c]−c ≥ µw01+(1−µ)w00−c. (3.3)
Fourth, shirking in both stages has to be unprofitable:
µ[µ1w11 + (1− µ1)w10 − c] + (1− µ)[µ0w01 + (1− µ0)w00 − c]− c ≥ w00. (3.4)
Finally, the contract should be acceptable for the agent:
µ[µ1w11 + (1− µ1)w10 − c] + (1− µ)[µ0w01 + (1− µ0)w00 − c]− c ≥ 0. (3.5)
Since µ > µ0, the last constraint is automatically satisfied with strict inequality by
(3.3), (3.2), and the limited liability condition. Put differently, the agent can secure
rent if the principal wants to implement effort plan (1, 1) in the objective scenario.
This is because if he complies, his performance in stage 1 conveys information about
the unknown quality of the match. More specifically, bad performance gives rise to
the pessimistic posterior µ0. Since the agent must continue to work hard, the principal
has to offset the demotivating experience by a high reward for good performance in
stage 2. But if the agent actually failed in stage 1 because he shirked, no information is
conveyed via his performance, so that he is not pessimistic to be successful through hard
work in stage 2. However, the principal deems the outcome of stage 1 to be informative
since, in equilibrium, there is no shirking; she provides the same high-powered incentive
whenever performance in stage 1 is bad. Taking limited liability into account, the agent
must therefore get a strictly positive payoff if he deviates from effort plan (1, 1) and
works according to (0, 1). Hence, it requires a rent to make (1, 1) incentive-compatible.
The cheapest wage schemes that implement effort plan (1, 1) thus solve
min
w≥0
µ[µ1w11 + (1− µ1)w10] + (1− µ)[µ0w01 + (1− µ0)w00] s.t. (3.1)–(3.4).
Lemma 3.1. In the objective scenario, wage scheme w∗ with
(w∗00, w
∗
10, w
∗
01, w
∗
11) =
(
0,
c
µ
,
c
µ0
,
c
µ
+
c
µ0
)
.
implements effort plan (1, 1) as cheaply as possible.
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Proof. Note first that (3.3) and (3.2) together ensure (3.4). Next, I reformulate (3.1)–
(3.3):
µ1(w11 − w10) ≥ c, (3.1’)
µ0(w01 − w00) ≥ c, (3.2’)
µ[µ1(w11 − w10) + w10 − µ1(w01 − w00)− w00] ≥ c. (3.3’)
It is now routine to verify that (3.2’) and (3.3’) bind and that the proposed wage scheme
indeed solves the program.
The wage scheme in Lemma 3.1 rewards performance in stage 2 independently of
performance in stage 1.18 In particular, wages do not condition on the principal’s
posterior expectation of match quality, so that the agent has no incentive to manipulate
it. Relative to this posterior, however, the wage scheme is too high-powered when stage
1 was successful (constraint (3.1) holds with strict inequality). As a consequence, the
principal does not get the entire surplus but shares it with the agent. The following
notation for the generated surplus and the agent’s payoff will be helpful in stating this
result:
S = µR− c (3.6)
A =
(
µ
µ0
− 1
)
c. (3.7)
Proposition 3.1. In the objective scenario, the principal’s profit is 2S − A, the agent
receives A, and the budget breaker is not involved.
3.3.2 Subjective scenario
Consider now the subjective scenario, where the agent’s performance in stage 1 is not
verifiable and privately observed by the principal. Clearly, to provide an incentive to
work hard repeatedly the agent needs to be rewarded depending on his performance
in each stage. The principal must therefore make the wage scheme contingent on her
subjective evaluation, which leads to two difficulties.
18The optimal wage scheme is not unique. For instance, w = (0, 0, c/µ0, c/(µµ1)+c/µ0) also satisfies
all constraints and is equally costly as w∗.
50
First, due to its subjective nature, the performance evaluation in stage 1 may lack
credibility: ex post, the principal could prefer to submit a dishonest evaluation to save
on wages. But the agent will shirk if he cannot be sure to receive a reward for good
performance. To overcome this difficulty, the principal must involve the budget breaker.
Transfers to this third party will solve her credibility problem.
The second difficulty relates to the fact that this principal-agent relationship com-
prises two stages, rather than just one. More precisely, it is not clear whether the
principal should reveal her evaluation already before stage 2 begins, or afterwards, and
in which form this should be done.19 I take the following approach to address these is-
sues. First, I derive a payment scheme involving wages to the agent and transfers to the
budget breaker that implements effort plan (1, 1) as cheaply as possible with mediated
talk. The presence of a mediator allows for additional communication protocols and
can only benefit the principal. In a second step, I show that face-to-face communication
after stage 2 works as well as mediated talk. The advantage of this approach is that
the benchmark case with mediator can be analyzed using the revelation principle for
multistage games (Myerson, 1986).
So suppose for the moment a mediator (i.e., an impartial person with whom each
party can communicate confidentially) is available to coordinate communication. Ac-
cording to the revelation principle, the cheapest contracts that implement effort plan
(1, 1) can be found in the class of contracts with the following communication proto-
col: Before stage 2, the principal reports her evaluation in form of a verifiable message
m ∈ {0, 1} to the mediator, who publicly reveals it after stage 2. No further commu-
nication takes place; in particular, the agent does not receive interim feedback about
19Exactly these questions are raised by the literature on interim feedback during long-term rela-
tionships. For example, Lizzeri et al. (2002), who consider a situation without uncertainty, find that
the principal should not communicate the agent’s interim performance before the project is completed.
Suvorov and van de Ven (2009), on the other hand, show that if the principal cannot commit to a
wage scheme, coarse feedback in connection with a bonus payment is beneficial. Similarly, in dynamic
tournaments it might be advantageous to announce an ordinal midterm ranking (Gershkov and Perry,
2009), provide full feedback (Ederer, 2010) or partially disclose the participants’ interim performance
(Goltsman and Mukherjee, 2011).
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his performance in stage 1.20 The revelation principle furthermore asserts that con-
tracts may without loss of generality specify payments which induce the principal to
submit an honest report. In the following, I restrict the analysis to contracts with these
properties.
Let w = (wmx2)m,x2∈{0,1} be a wage scheme and denote by b = (bmx2)m,x2∈{0,1}
a scheme of non-negative transfers from the principal to the budget breaker. Here,
m ∈ {0, 1} stands for the principal’s reported evaluation, which will be honest in
equilibrium. I refer to a combination (w, b) as a payment scheme.
The wage scheme must make effort plan (1, 1) incentive-compatible for the agent
given that the principal truthfully reports to the mediator. In contrast to the objective
scenario, the agent is now uninformed about past performance when choosing an effort
level in stage 2. He can only use the prior expectation to estimate the quality of the
match. Therefore, the incentive constraint for stage 2 pools the conditions (3.1) and
(3.2):
µ[µ1w11 +(1−µ1)w10− c]+ (1−µ)[µ0w01 +(1−µ0)w00− c] ≥ µw10 +(1−µ)w00. (3.8)
Furthermore, the incentive constraints (3.3) and (3.4) must be met to induce hard work
in each stage. The agent’s participation is then guaranteed by the limited liability
assumption.
Of course, the wage scheme will only be credible for the agent if the principal is
indeed willing to truthfully report her subjective evaluation to the mediator. Since the
report is not transmitted to the agent before the project is completed, it cannot affect
effort but only payments. Whenever wages alone would tempt the principal to cheat,
transfers to the budget breaker need to be specified such that the correct report leads
to the lowest total payment for the principal. Formally, in case the principal observes
20In general, the revelation principle prescribes that the agent receives recommendations from the
mediator as to which effort to provide and that the agent sends reports to the mediator as to which
effort he did provide. Here, recommendations would be superfluous since the agent is always supposed
to work hard. Reports would also be superfluous: The principal would always expect that the agent
reports hard work. The agent would have to be indifferent between all reports. Thus, neither the
principal’s incentives to be honest nor the agent’s incentives to work hard would change with reports.
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good performance this requires
µ1(w11 + b11) + (1− µ1)(w10 + b10) ≤ µ1(w01 + b01) + (1− µ1)(w00 + b00), (3.9)
whereas for bad performance it has to be
µ0(w01 + b01) + (1− µ0)(w00 + b00) ≤ µ0(w11 + b11) + (1− µ0)(w10 + b10). (3.10)
I have now identified all conditions which a payment scheme must satisfy to imple-
ment effort plan (1, 1) with mediated communication. Conditions (3.3), (3.4), and (3.8)
rule out deviations by the agent to the effort plans (0,1), (0,0), and (1,0), respectively.
Conditions (3.9) and (3.10), on the other hand, ensure that the principal honestly re-
ports her subjective evaluation of stage 1 to the mediator. Hence, the cheapest payment
schemes solve
min
(w,b)≥0
µ[µ1(w11 + b11) + (1− µ1)(w10 + b10)]
+ (1− µ)[µ0(w01 + b01) + (1− µ0)(w00 + b00)]
s.t. (3.3), (3.4), (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10).
Lemma 3.2. In the subjective scenario with mediator, payment scheme (w?, b?) with
(w?00, w
?
10, w
?
01, w
?
11) =
(
0, 0,
c
µ
,
c
µµ1
+
c
µ
)
and (b?00, b
?
10, b
?
01, b
?
11) =
(
0, 0,
c
µµ1
, 0
)
implements effort plan (1, 1) as cheaply as possible.
Proof. See Claim A4.2 in Appendix A4.
The payment scheme in Lemma 3.2, (w?, b?), in fact pointwisely satisfies the princi-
pal’s truth-telling constraints for each performance outcome of stage 2:
w?11 + b
?
11 = w
?
01 + b
?
01 and w
?
10 + b
?
10 = w
?
00 + b
?
00. (3.11)
Thus, if the principal had to report her subjective evaluation after stage 2, rather than
before, she would be honest as well. I now exploit this property to construct a contract
that implements effort plan (1, 1) in the original setting without mediator at same
costs as the best contracts with mediated talk.21 Since the presence of a mediator did
21The optimal payment scheme with mediator is not unique. For instance, scheme (w, b) with
w = (0, c/µ, c/µ, 2c/µ) and b = b? also satisfies all constraints and is equally costly as (w?, b?).
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µ
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(b) Payment scheme (w?, b?)
Figure 3.1: Non-contingent versus contingent reward for stage 1
not preclude any mode of face-to-face communication, it is impossible to find a better
contract. Let the payment scheme be (w?, b?). Communication proceeds as follows.
After stage 2, the principal reports her evaluation of stage 1 in form of a verifiable
message m ∈ {0, 1} to the agent. No further communication takes place. From the
agent’s perspective, nothing has changed as compared with mediation, provided that
the principal is still willing to report truthfully. And this is indeed the case, for, by
(3.11), any report results in the same payment.
Without transfers to the budget breaker, the principal would always report bad
performance to save on wages. The (non-mediated) contract described above confers
credibility by committing the principal to pay the bonus for stage 1 regardless of the
content of her subjective evaluation—to the agent if he was successful and otherwise
to the budget breaker. The payoff to the budget breaker is the cost entailed by the
principal’s credibility issue. I state this result using the notation
B =
(
1
µ1
− 1
)
c.
Proposition 3.2. In the subjective scenario, the principal’s profit is 2S−B, the agent’s
payoff is zero, and the budget breaker receives B.
I finally highlight an important property of the derived contract: it only rewards the
agent for success in stage 1 if he performs well in stage 2 again. Figure 3.1 illustrates
the benefit of this arrangement. The panel on the left-hand side depicts the payments
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under the scheme (w˜, b˜), which rewards good performance in stage 1 independently
of stage 2 with the bonus c/µ. Here, the budget breaker’s payoff is B˜ = (1/µ − 1)c.
Scheme (w?, b?), depicted on the right-hand side, only differs from (w˜, b˜) in that it just
rewards the agent for stage 1 if stage 2 is successful as well. In expectation, (w?, b?)
provides the agent with the same bonus as (w˜, b˜), so that—given risk-neutrality—he
has the same incentive to work hard. But the budget breaker’s payoff is just B < B˜.
The principal essentially benefits from making the bonus for stage 1 contingent on
good performance in stage 2 because that event is more likely with a positive subjective
evaluation, which indicates high match quality. Hence, the probability that the bonus
will be paid out to the budget breaker, rather than the agent, reduces.
3.3.3 Comparison of the scenarios
The previous findings can be used to compare the two scenarios with respect to the
principal’s profit. By Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, implementing hard work in each stage
requires incentive costs, namely A in the objective and B in the subjective scenario.
Proposition 3.3 follows immediately.
Proposition 3.3.
1. Suppose A = B. The scenarios are equivalent with respect to the principal’s profit.
2. Suppose A < B. The principal’s profit is strictly larger in the objective scenario.
3. Suppose A > B. The principal’s profit is strictly larger in the subjective scenario.
Each scenario has its own problem if the agent is to work hard repeatedly. In case
performance in stage 1 is objectively evaluated (objective scenario), the outcome of
stage 1 cannot be concealed from the agent. It conveys information about the un-
known quality of the match, which just the agent can interpret correctly with certainty.
Therefore, the agent receives private information before the project is completed, and
it secures him a rent. With a subjective evaluation (subjective scenario), on the other
hand, this problem does not arise. It is the principal who obtains private information,
and she may communicate with the agent only after his job is done. But in contrast
to the objective scenario, the principal must involve the budget breaker to make the
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evaluation credible. Each problem can be more substantial, and each ranking of the
scenarios can arise.
Uncertainty about match quality causes the problem in the objective scenario. More
uncertainty, in form of more extreme posteriors after stage 1, increases the rent that the
agent can secure by pretending to have a pessimistic belief. In contrast, more uncer-
tainty diminishes the problem that arises in the subjective scenario. Recall that, in this
scenario, the principal optimally rewards the agent for stage 1 only if stage 2 is success-
ful. Now, this event becomes less likely after a negative and more likely after a positive
evaluation if stage 1 gets more informative about match quality. Hence, the probability
with which the principal pays the bonus to the budget breaker decreases. Moreover,
the principal can decrease the bonus itself, for the agent will be more confident to earn
it. Both lowers the budget breaker’s payoff, the cost entailed by the credibility issue.
In summary, more uncertainty is detrimental in the objective but beneficial in the sub-
jective scenario. I state this result using the concept of mean preserving spread (MPS)
as a criterion for differences in uncertainty.22
Proposition 3.4. Suppose F is replaced by an MPS.
1. In the objective scenario, the principal’s profit decreases.
2. In the subjective scenario, the principal’s profit increases.
Proof. By the definition of MPS, the prior µ does not change. The posteriors µ1 and
µ0, on the other hand, are expectations of a convex and a concave function, respectively
(see footnote 14). It follows that µ1 is greater and µ0 smaller than given F . Thus, the
MPS leaves S unchanged, raises A, and lowers B. In light of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2,
this finding concludes the proof.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter suggests an explanation as to why incentive pay sometimes depends on
subjective performance evaluations even though comprehensive objective appraisal sys-
22Given two distribution functions F1 and F2 of match quality, F2 is an MPS of F1 if and only if∫ 1
0
h(θ)dF2 ≤
∫ 1
0
h(θ)dF1 for any concave function h over [0, 1]; see, e.g., Proposition 6.D.2 in Mas-
Colell et al. (1995).
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tems seem feasible. My analysis builds on two central assumptions. First, an evaluation
is considered as a means to generate information about the worker’s performance that
would remain unknown otherwise. Second, the acquired information is either private
and unverifiable or public and verifiable, depending on whether the employer rates sub-
jectively or objectively. Verifiability is clearly an important concern since discretionary
compensation entails a credibility issue for the employer. I show that, nevertheless,
subjective evaluations can be advantageous because they allow to withhold information
from the worker. Indeed, withholding information seems particularly important under
circumstances where the credibility issue is small. According to my analysis, subjective
evaluations are used at early stages of employment relationships in which characteristics
that determine the worker’s success on the job are highly uncertain.
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Appendices
A1 Chapter 1: Formal results
Claim A1.1. (1.3)–(1.6) hold if and only if (IA) and
U(1)− U(1) ∈
[
(β − β)q + γ
p
, (β − β)q − γ
1− p
]
(A1.1)
are satisfied.
Proof. Conditions (1.3) and (1.4), which ensure that the agent acquires information if
this is recommended, are equivalent to
U(1) ≤ U(1)− (β − β)q − γ
p
U(1) ≤ U(1) + (β − β)q − γ
1− p.
These two inequalities guarantee the adverse selection conditions (1.5) and (1.6) and
are equivalent to (IA) together with (A1.1) .
Claim A1.2. If a contract satisfies conditions (1.2), (IA), and (A1.1), then U(α) ≥ 0.
Proof. If the agent is to stay uninformed after signing and production costs are low, he
gets the extra payoff
U(0)− U(0) = (β − β)q ≥ 0.
On the other hand, conditions (IA) and (A1.1) require
U(1)− U(1) > 0,
so that U(α) ≥ U(α). If the contract satisfies the individual rationality condition (1.2),
this inequality implies U(α) ≥ 0.
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Claim A1.3. Suppose a contract satisfies (1.1), (1.2), (IA), and (A1.1). Then, there
is a contract which satisfies (1.1), (1.2), (IA), and
U(1)− U(1) = (β − β)q + γ
p
(1.7)
and results in identical payoffs.
Proof. In particular, suppose the original contract, denoted by C, implies
U(1)− U(1) = (β − β)q + γ
p
+ r,
where r is such that (A1.1) holds. The alternative contract, denoted by C ′, differs from
C in two aspects. First, it specifies t′ = t− r. Because of this difference, equation (1.7)
holds. Second, it specifies t′ = t+ pαr
1−α . Together, these two differences imply,
pU ′(α) + (1− p)U ′(α) = pU(α) + (1− p)U(α),
so that the alternative contract C ′ results in identical payoffs for both parties given
that it satisfies (1.1), (1.2), and (IA). Conditions (1.2) and (IA) hold because of the
preceding equation and since the two contracts specify the same output levels, respec-
tively. Condition (1.1) holds because U ′(α) ≥ 0 by Claim A1.2 and U ′(α) ≥ U(α) by
the specification of C ′.
Claim A1.4. There exists a cutoff γ1 such that it holds for any α ∈ (0, 1):
(1− α)W (0, γ) + αW (1, γ) < W (α, γ) if and only if γ > γ1.
Proof. Take any α ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality, I may relabel U(α) = (1 −
α)U(0). Then, by definition,
W (α, γ) = max
U(0),(q,q,q)≥0
(1− α)[V (q)− βq − U(0)]
+ α{−γ + p[V (q)− βq]}
+ α(1− p)[V (q)− (β + p
1−p(β − β))q]
+ λ1[(1− p)U(0) + γ]
+ λ2[U0 + p(β − β)(q + α1−αq)]
+ λ3[(1− p)p(β − β)(q − q)− γ],
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where the λs are non-negative Lagrange multipliers. On the other hand, the left hand
side of the inequality in the claim can be stated as
(1− α)W (0, γ) + αW (1, γ) = max
U(0),(q,q,q)≥0
(1− α)[V (q)− βq − U(0)]
+ α{−γ + p[V (q)− βq]}
+ α(1− p)[V (q)− (β + p
1−p(β − β))q]
+ µ1[(1− p)U(0) + γ]
+ µ2[U(0) + p(β − β)q]
+ µ3[(1− p)p(β − β)(q − q)− γ],
where the µs are non-negative Lagrange multipliers. The two programs only differ as
to the second constraint, and the inequality in the claim holds if and only if µ2 > 0.
One can verify that this is equivalent to γ > (1− p)p(β − β)q∗ ≡ γ1.
Claim A1.5. Define
S = {((t, q), (t, q)) : U(1) ≥ 0, (IA), (1.7)},
P = {(t, q) : (1− p)U(0) + γ ≥ 0, U(0) + p(β − β)q ≥ 0},
and
P˜ (α, ((t, q), (t, q))) = {(t, q) : (1− p)[U(0) + α
1−αU(1)] + γ ≥ 0,
U(0) + α
1−αU(1) + p(β − β)[q + α1−αq] ≥ 0}.
1. For each contract that satisfies (NIA), (IR), (IA), and (1.7), there is a contract
that satisfies U(1) ≥ 0 in addition and results in identical payoffs.
2. Given U(1) ≥ 0, a contract satisfies (NIA), (IR), (IA), and (1.7) if and only if
- the separating schedule is in S if α > 0
- the pooling schedule is in P if α = 0 and in P˜ (α, ((t, q), (t, q))) if α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Given α = 1, condition (NIA) requires U(α) ≥ 0. For α < 1, on the other hand,
one may without loss of generality relabel U(α) = (1− α)U(0), so that U(1) = 0. The
implications for the implementable schedules now follow from (NIA), (IR), (IA), and
(1.7).
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Claim A1.6. W is continuous.
Proof. Note first that, formally, W (α, γ) is the maximum value of program
P(α, γ) : max
U(α),(q,q,q)≥0
Π s.t. (NIA), (IR), (IA),
where α ∈ [0, 1]. Due to the assumptions on V , there exists a unique solution to this
program (see footnote 18).
The claim holds by the maximum theorem (e.g., de la Fuente, 2000, p. 301) if the cor-
respondence that assigns to each (α, γ) the set of feasible choices in P(α, γ) is compact-
valued and continuous. I denote this correspondence by F . It is not compact because
there are no upper bounds on U(α), q, and q.23 By adding non-binding constraints, I
will replace it by another correspondence f such that maximization with respect to f
yields the same maximum value W (α, γ) and such that f is compact-valued and con-
tinuous. Consequently, W (α, γ) has to be continuous by the maximum theorem. I will
use the following lemma (which is a special case of Thm. 2.2, p. 303, in de la Fuente,
2000):
(I) For i = 1, . . . , I, let gi(U(α), q, q, q, α, γ) : R4 × [0, 1] × R>0 → R be continuous
functions that are affine given (α, γ), and define the correspondence f : [0, 1] ×
R>0 ⇒ R4 by
f(α, γ) = {(U(α), q, q, q) : gi(U(α), q, q, q, α, γ) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I}.
Let f(α̂, γ̂) be compact, and assume that there is some point (U ′(α̂), q′, q′, q′) ∈
f(α̂, γ̂) such that gi(U ′(α̂), q′, q′, q′, α̂, γ̂) > 0 for all i. Then, f is continuous at
(α̂, γ̂).
It can be checked that for k > 0 and φ = (1 − p)p(β − β), the following conditions
would be non-binding as additional constraints in P(α, γ):
U(α) ≤ k, q ≤ q∗ + k, and q ≤ max{q∗, q∗ + γ
φ
}+ k.
Add them to P(α, γ). This yields a bounded feasible set, which I denote by f(α, γ).
It can be described by level sets of continuous functions gi(U(α), q, q, q, α, γ), where
23In contrast, (IA) provides an upper bound for q.
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the functions are affine given (α, γ). Being an intersection of closed sets, f(α, γ) is
closed and therefore compact. At the point (U ′(α), q′, q′, q′) = (0, q∗, q∗,max{q∗, q∗ +
γ
φ
}), all constraints are satisfied with strict inequality. Hence, the correspondence f is
continuous by (I). If the feasible set F (α, γ) in problem P(α, γ) is replaced by f(α, γ),
one obtains the same maximum value W (α, γ) because the solution with respect to
F (α, γ) is contained in f(α, γ) and f(α, γ) itself is contained in F (α, γ).
Claim A1.7. There exists a unique intersection γ2 of W (0, ·) and W (1, ·).
Proof. By definition,
W (0, γ) = max
U(0),q≥0
V (q)− E[β]q − U(0)− p(β − β)q
+ λ1[(1− p)U(0) + γ]
+ λ2[U(0) + p(β − β)q],
where the λs are non-negative Lagrange multipliers. Also by definition,
W (1, γ) = max
U(1),(q,q)≥0
− γ + p[V (q)− βq] + (1− p)[V (q)− βq]
− U(1)− p(β − β)q
+ µ1U(1)
+ µ2[(1− p)p(β − β)(q − q)− γ],
where the µs are non-negative Lagrange multipliers. W (0, ·) and W (1, ·) are concave
functions of γ (e.g., de la Fuente, 2000, p. 313, Thm. 2.12) and therefore differentiable
almost everywhere. At points where they are differentiable, it holds that
dW (0, γ)
dγ
= λ1 ≥ 0
dW (1, γ)
dγ
= −1− µ2 < 0,
so that (by continuity of W , see Claim A1.6) there can be at most one intersection.
Furthermore, one can check that (i)W (1, 0) > W (0, 0), and that (ii)W (1, γ̂) < W (0, γ̂),
where γ̂ = W (1, 0) −W (0, 0) + k with k > 0.24 Therefore, any intersection must lie
in the interval (0, γ̂). Since the functions W (0, ·) and W (1, ·) are continuous by Claim
A1.6, the intermediate value theorem implies that an intersection exists.
24W (·, 0) is to denote limγ→0W (·, γ).
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Claim A1.8. There exists a cutoff p0 < 1 such that γ2 > γ1 if p > p0.
Proof. Recall from the proof of Claim A1.4 that γ1 ≡ (1 − p)p(β − β)q∗; γ2, on the
other hand, denotes the intersection of W (0, ·) and W (1, ·).
According to the proof of Claim A1.7, W (0, ·) is increasing and W (1, ·) decreasing.
Moreover, both functions are continuous by Claim A1.6. Therefore, γ2 > γ1 holds if
and only if W (1, γ1) > W (0, γ1).
As can be verified,
W (0, γ1) = max
q≥0
V (q)− βq + p(β − β)q∗
= V (q∗)− βq∗ − (1− p)(β − β)q∗.
Consider now W (1, γ1). At this level of investigation costs, condition (IA) reads q −
q − q∗ ≥ 0. Therefore,
W (1, γ1) = max
(q,q)≥0
−γ1 + p[V (q)− βq] + (1− p)[V (q)− βq]− p(β − β)q
s.t. q − q − q∗ ≥ 0
≥− (1− p)p(β − β)q∗ + p[V (q∗)− βq∗],
which concludes the proof (e.g., define p0 ≡ [V (q∗)− βq∗]/[V (q∗)− βq∗]).
A2 Chapter 1: Arbitrary number of types
This appendix shows that the benefits of stochastic contracts are not a peculiarity of
the original model with its two states of nature. To this end, consider now the more
general case in which the agent’s production costs are drawn from the set {β1, . . . , βn}.
Suppose 0 < β1 < . . . < βn, and let pi > 0 be the probability of state i.
The arguments in section 1.3.1 as to the relevant class of contracts do not depend
on the number of states. Thus, only the structure of the separating schedule has to be
modified, and the principal can confine herself to contracts of the form
c = {α, (t, q), (ti, qi)ni=1}.
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As before, the proposed contract must deter precontractual investigation, be acceptable,
and induce the agent to be obedient and honest if he is asked to investigate his costs.
Using the notation Ui(α) = (1− α)(t− βiq) + α(ti − βiqi), these conditions read:
n∑
i=1
piUi(α)− αγ ≥
n∑
i=1
pi max{Ui(α), 0} − γ (A2.1)
n∑
i=1
piUi(α)− αγ ≥ 0 (A2.2)
n∑
i=1
piUi(1)− γ ≥ Uj(1)− (E[β]− βj)qj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (A2.3)
Ui(1) ≥ Uj(1)− (βi − βj)qj ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (A2.4)
The principal’s payoff from such a contract is
ν = (1− α)[V (q)− t] + α
[
n∑
i=1
V (qi)− ti
]
,
so that the contracting problem can be stated as
max
c
ν s.t. (A2.1)–(A2.4).
The analysis of the case with two levels of production costs—the original model—is
special in that the moral hazard constraints (A2.3) imply the adverse selection con-
straints (A2.4). But the benefits of stochastic contracts are robust: according to Claim
A2.1, stochastic contracts generally allow to implement schedules that are incompatible
with deterministic contracts (cf. Claim A1.5 in Appendix A1). An analogous procedure
as in the main text can be applied to show that the additional choices may indeed be
relevant for the principal.
Claim A2.1. Define
E =
{
(ti, qi)
n
i=1 : Un(1) ≥ 0, (A2.3), (A2.4)
}
,
F =
{
(t, q) :
n∑
i=j+1
piUi(0) + γ ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
n∑
i=1
piUi(0) ≥ 0
}
,
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and
F˜ (α, (ti, qi)
n
i=1) =
{
(t, q) :
n∑
i=j+1
pi
[
Ui(0) +
α
1− αUi(1)
]
+ γ ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
n∑
i=1
piUi(0) +
α
1− α
[
n∑
i=1
piUi(1)− γ
]
≥ 0}.
1. For each contract that satisfies (A2.1)–(A2.4), there is a contract that satisfies
Un(1) ≥ 0 in addition and results in identical payoffs.
2. Given Un(1) ≥ 0, a contract satisfies (A2.1)–(A2.4) if and only if
- the separating schedule is in E if α > 0
- the pooling schedule is in F if α = 0 and in F˜ (α, (ti, qi)ni=1) if α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. I first derive some auxiliary results.
(II) By standard arguments, the adverse selection constraints (A2.4) are equivalent to
Ui(1)− Ui+1(1) ∈ [(βi+1 − βi)qi+1, (βi+1 − βi)qi] ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
together with q1 ≥ · · · ≥ qn. This implies U1(1) ≥ . . . ≥ Un(1). Moreover, by
definition it holds that
Ui(0)− Ui+1(0) = (βi+1 − βi)q ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
so that any contract which satisfies (A2.4) involves U1(α) ≥ . . . ≥ Un(α). Condi-
tion (A2.1) may therefore be reformulated as
n∑
i=1
piUi(α)− αγ ≥
j∑
i=1
piUi(α)− γ ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
The two statements of the claim can now be proved.
1. Suppose first α = 1. According to (II), (A2.1) requires Un(1) ≥ 0 if (A2.4) is to
hold. Next, consider the case α < 1 and suppose the original contract, denoted
by c, implies Un(1) = −r < 0. The alternative contract, denoted by c′, differs in
two aspects. First, it specifies t′i = ti + r for all i, so that U ′n(1) = 0. Second, it
specifies t′ = t− α
1−αr. These modifications imply
U ′i(α) = Ui(α) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (A2.5)
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Thus, the alternative contract results in identical payoffs given that it satisfies
(A2.1)–(A2.4). Conditions (A2.1) and (A2.2) are met because of (A2.5). Condi-
tion (A2.3) holds since both sides of these inequalities are raised by r. Finally,
(II) implies that condition (A2.4) is satisfied because the two contracts specify
the same output levels and
U ′i(1)− U ′i+1(1) = Ui(1)− Ui+1(1) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
2. Follows from (A2.1)–(A2.4) and (II).
A3 Chapter 2: Formal results
Claim A3.1. (P1) is satisfied if and only if it holds that
Ui − Ui+1 ∈ [(βi+1 − βi) qi+1, (βi+1 − βi) qi] ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} (A3.1)
qi − qi+1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} (2.2)
Proof. The proof is standard and, therefore, omitted.
Claim A3.2. If CP satisfies (P1) and (P2), condition (P3) holds as well if and only if
m∑
j=l
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijUi
]
+ e ≥ 0 ∀l ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. (A3.2)
Proof. I first derive some auxiliary results.
(I) First, straightforward algebra shows that (P3) is equivalent to
m∑
j=1
pij min
{
0,
n∑
i=1
γijUi
}
+ e ≥ 0.
Second, according to Claim A3.1 (P1) implies Ui ≥ Ui+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}
and hence, by the first-order stochastic dominance ranking of the ex-ante types,
n∑
i=1
γijUi ≥
n∑
i=1
γi(j+1)Ui ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. (A3.3)
Third, given (A3.3) a necessary condition for (P2) is
∑n
i=1 γi1Ui ≥ 0.
75
The claim can now be proved. Suppose CP satisfies (P1) and (P2) but violates (P3).
By (I), there is an l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that
m∑
j=1
pij min
{
0,
n∑
i=1
γijUi
}
+ e =
m∑
j=l
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijUi
]
+ e < 0;
hence, (A3.2) does not hold. Suppose CP satisfies (P1) and (P2) but violates (A3.2).
Let l ∈ {2, . . . ,m} be the smallest j such that ∑ni=1 γijUi < 0. By (I),
0 >
m∑
j=l
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijUi
]
+ e =
m∑
j=1
pij min
{
0,
n∑
i=1
γijUi
}
+ e;
that is, (P3) does not hold.
Claim A3.3. Suppose CP satisfies (A3.1), (2.2), (P2), and (P3). Then there is a
pooling contract which satisfies (2.2), (P2), (P3), and
Ui − Ui+1 = (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} (2.1)
and results in identical expected payoffs.
Proof. Suppose there exists an i′ ∈ I for which the original contract CP implies
Ui′ − Ui′+1 = (βi′+1 − βi′) qi′+1 + υ,
where υ is such that (A3.1) holds. The alternative contract, denoted by C˜P , differs
from CP only with respect to transfers. Specifically,
t˜k =
tk −
(
1−
[∑m
j=1 pijΓi′j
])
υ if k ∈ {1, . . . , i′}
tk +
∑m
j=1 pijΓi′jυ if k ∈ {i′ + 1, . . . , n}.
This difference implies
U˜i′ − U˜i′+1 = (βi′+1 − βi′) qi′+1
and
U˜i − U˜i+1 = Ui − Ui+1 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} \ i′.
Furthermore,
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γij t˜i
]
=
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijti
]
,
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so that the alternative contract satisfies (P2) and—if (P3) is also met—results in iden-
tical expected payoffs as the original one. Since, for any l ∈ {2, . . . ,m},
m∑
j=l
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijU˜i
]
+ e =
m∑
j=l
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijUi − Γi′jυ +
m∑
j=1
pijΓi′jυ
]
+ e
>
m∑
j=l
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijUi
]
+ e ≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from the first-order stochastic dominance ranking and
the second one from the hypothesis, Claim A3.2 ensures that condition (P3) is met.
Claim A3.4. If Condition 2.1 holds, there exist solutions to both PP and PS.
Proof. I will use the following theorem (e.g., Rockafellar, 1970, Thm. 27.3):
(II) Let h : RI → R ∪ {−∞} be a closed proper concave function, and let D ⊆ RI be
a non-empty closed convex set over which h is to be maximized. If h and D have
no direction of recession in common, then h attains its supremum over D.25
Consider first program PP . The objective function can be restated as follows:
h(CP ) =

∑m
j=1 pij [
∑n
i=1 γij[V (qi)− ti]] if qi ≥ 0∀i ∈ I
−∞ else.
Due to the assumptions on V , h is a closed proper concave function. Next, let D be the
set of all combinations CP that satisfy (P1)–(P3). These constraints can be described
by closed level sets of affine functions, so that D must be closed and convex. D is
furthermore non-empty—for instance, CP with (ti, qi) = (0, 0) for all i ∈ I satisfies
(P1)–(P3).
I now apply (II) and show that h and D have no directions of recession in common.
As V ′(∞) = 0, and because h(CP ) = −∞ if CP contains some negative qi, any direction
of recession of h satisfies
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γijti
]
≤ 0 and qi ≥ 0∀i ∈ I.
25According to Rockafellar (1970), a concave function h : RI → R ∪ {−∞} is proper if h(x) > −∞
for at least one x, and it is closed if {x : h(x) ≥ α} is closed for every α ∈ R. A vector y 6= 0 is
a direction of recession of a convex set D if x + λy ∈ D for every λ ≥ 0 and every x ∈ D. The
directions of recession of a closed proper concave function h are the directions of recession of the sets
{x : h(x) ≥ α}, where α ∈ R.
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But even the set of all CP that are compatible with (P2) cannot have such directions
of recession.
Consider now program PS. The set of all CS that satisfy (S1)–(S4) is non-empty—
for instance, any CS with
(tij, qij) =
(0, 0)∀ i ∈ I if j 6= 1(t, q)∀ i ∈ I if j = 1,
where (t, q) fulfills
pi1
[
t−
[
n∑
i=1
γi1βiq
]]
− e ≥ 0 and t−
[
n∑
i=1
γi2βiq
]
≤ 0,
satisfies (S1)–(S4). Such combinations exist due to the first-order stochastic dominance
ranking of the ex-ante types. Existence of solutions to program PS can now be proved
analogously to program PP .
Claim A3.5. If Condition 2.1 holds, W P is non-decreasing and W S non-increasing.
Proof. If e increases, the feasible sets in PP and PS expand and contract, respectively.
The corresponding objective functions, on the other hand, do not vary with e.
Claim A3.6. There exists a cutoff η > 0 such that for any e < η
W P (e) = max
(qi)ni=1
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γij[V (qi)− βiqi]
]
−
[
− e
pim
+
m−1∑
j=1
pij
[
n−1∑
i=1
(Γij − Γim)(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]]
s.t. (2.2).
Proof. I first derive some auxiliary results, using insights by CK.
(III) There exists a value q > 0 such that for any e solutions to P˜P satisfy qi ≥ q for
all i ∈ I.
Proof. This is Claim 1 of the appendix by CK. Their proof applies to the current
setting.
(IV) There exists a cutoff ψ > 0 such that for any e < ψ solutions to P˜P satisfy
m∑
j=l
pij
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
+ e > 0 ∀l ∈ {2, . . . ,m− 1}.
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Proof. This is analogous to Claim 2 of the appendix by CK. By (III) and the
first-order stochastic dominance ranking of the ex-ante types, solutions involve
n−1∑
i=1
Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1 >
n−1∑
i=1
Γi(j+1)(βi+1 − βi)qi+1 ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} (A3.4)
To prove the statement it thus suffices to show that, for low e,
m∑
j=m−1
pij
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
+ e = 0
is impossible. Suppose, by contradiction, this equality holds. Then
pim
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γim(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
≤ pim
[
pim−1
pim + pim−1
n−1∑
i=1
(Γim − Γi(m−1))(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
< pim
[
pim−1
pim + pim−1
n−1∑
i=1
(Γim − Γi(m−1))(βi+1 − βi)q
]
< 0,
where the first inequality follows by hypothesis and the latter ones by (III) and
the first-order stochastic dominance ranking of the ex-ante types. Hence, the
term pim
[
Un +
∑n−1
i=1 Γim(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
is bounded above away from zero. This
implies that constraint (2.4) cannot hold for low e; a contradiction.
The claim can now be proved. By (A3.4), solutions to P˜P involve
m∑
j=1
pij
[
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γij(βi+1 − βi)qi+1
]
> Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γim(βi+1 − βi)qi+1.
Since Un enters the objective function with negative sign, this inequality and (IV)
imply that there exists an η > 0 such that constraint (2.3) holds with strict inequality
and
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γim(βi+1 − βi)qi+1 = − e
pim
.
Inserting this expression into the objective function establishes the claim.
Claim A3.7. If Condition 2.1 holds, both W P and W S are continuous.
Proof. W P and W S are concave, for the objective functions and constraints of the
corresponding maximization problems are concave in both the parameter e and the
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choice variables (e.g., de la Fuente, 2000, p. 313, Thm. 2.12). Hence, W P and W S
are continuous on (0,∞). Claim A3.6 implies that W P must be continuous at e =
0. Suppose W S is not continuous at e = 0. By concavity, lime↓0W S(e) exists and
lime↓0W S(e) > W S(0). This inequality contradicts Claim A3.5.
Claim A3.8. If Condition 2.1 holds, there exists a unique intersection of W S and W P .
Proof. The following expression will be helpful:
W ? =
m∑
j=1
pij
[
n∑
i=1
γij[V (q
?
i )− βiq∗i ]
]
.
Since q? maximizes surplus, W P (e) ≤ W ∗ and W S(e) ≤ W ∗ − e for all e.
I first argue that an intersection exists. If e = 0, to any C˜P which satisfies (P1)–(P3)
there corresponds a C˜S which satisfies (S1)–(S4) such that (t˜ij, q˜ij)i∈I = (t˜i, q˜i)i∈I for all
j ∈ J . Hence,W S(0) ≥ W P (0). SupposeW S(0) > W P (0), and define ê = W ?−W P (0).
As W P is weakly increasing by Claim A3.5, W S(ê) ≤ W P (ê). Since W S and W P are
continuous by Claim A3.7, the intermediate value theorem implies that an intersection
exists.
I now argue that there cannot be several intersections. Let e? be the cutoff level
of investigation costs such that constraint (2.4) binds in program P˜P if and only if
e < e∗. (Precisely, e? = −maxl∈{1,...,m−1}
∑m
j=l pij
[
U?n +
∑n−1
i=1 Γij(βi+1 − βi)q?i+1
]
, where
U?n = −
[∑m
j=1 pij
[∑n−1
i=1 Γij(βi+1 − βi)q?i+1
]]
.) That is,
W P (e)
< W
? if e < e?
= W ? else.
Since W S(e) < W ? for all e, any intersection of W S and W P must be strictly smaller
than e?. So suppose e < e?, and recall from the proof of Claim A3.7 thatW P is concave
and therefore differentiable almost everywhere. At points where it is differentiable, it
holds that
dW P (e)
de
=
m−1∑
j=1
κj,
where the κ′s denote non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated to constraint (2.4).
By definition of e?, at least one multiplier is strictly positive. Since the function W P is
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continuous by Claim A3.7, it must hence be strictly increasing on [0, e?). This implies
that there cannot be several intersections between W S and W P , for W S is weakly
decreasing by Claim A3.5.
Claim A3.9. Suppose Condition 2.1 is satisfied. Then, it holds that W S(0) > W P (0).
Proof. I first derive some auxiliary results.
(V) Suppose e = 0. Let CP be one of the best pooling contracts that satisfy (2.1)–(2.4).
Then, it holds that qi < q?i for all i > 1 and q1 = q?1.
Proof. By Claim A3.6,
qn ∈ arg max
q
m∑
j=1
pijγnj [V (q)− βnq]−
[
m−1∑
j=1
pij
(
Γ(n−1)j − Γ(n−1)m
)
(βn − βn−1)q
]
+ λn−1(qn−1 − q),
qi ∈ arg max
q
m∑
j=1
pijγij [V (q)− βiq]−
[
m−1∑
j=1
pij
(
Γ(i−1)j − Γ(i−1)m
)
(βi − βi−1)q
]
+ λi(q − qi+1) + λi−1(qi−1 − q) ∀ i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},
and
q1 ∈ arg max
q
m∑
j=1
pijγ1j [V (q)− β1q] + λ1(q − q2),
where the λs are non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated to constraint (2.2).
It follows that q1 = q?1 and qn < q?n. Consider an i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1} and suppose
qi+1 < q
?
i+1. If λi = 0, it holds that qi < q?i . If λi > 0, on the other hand,
complementary slackness implies qi = qi+1, so that qi < q?i by the induction
hypothesis.
(VI) Suppose e = 0. Let CP satisfy (2.1)–(2.4), and let CP satisfy (2.1) and (2.2).
Moreover, suppose q
i
≥ qi for all i ∈ I and
Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γi1 (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 = Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γi1 (βi+1 − βi) qi+1. (A3.5)
Then, there exists a separating contract ĈS satisfying (S1)–(S4) such that
(t̂i1, q̂i1)
n
i=1 = (ti, qi)
n
i=1 and (t̂ij, q̂ij)
n
i=1 = (ti, qi)
n
i=1 ∀j ∈ {2, . . . ,m}.
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Proof. Since both CP and CP satisfy (2.1) and (2.2), CS satisfies (S1) by Claim
A3.1 (resp. the analogue of the claim for (S1)). I next verify that CS satisfies
(S2). By (A3.5), ex-ante type γ1 has no incentive to send a dishonest report. For
all other ex-ante types, the gain from deviating is negative as well:
n∑
i=1
γij[ti − βiqi]−
[
n∑
i=1
γij[ti − βiqi]
]
= Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γij (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 − Un −
[
n−1∑
i=1
Γij (βi+1 − βi) qi+1
]
=
n∑
i=1
(Γij − Γi1) (βi+1 − βi) (qi+1 − qi+1) ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from the first-order stochastic dominance ranking
of the ex-ante types. Finally, given that investigation costs are zero, (S3) holds
since CP satisfies (2.4) and no ex-ante type has an incentive to deviate, and (S2)
implies (S4).
The claim can now be proved. Let CP be one of the best pooling contracts that satisfy
(2.1)–(2.4). Consider the combination CP , defined as follows:
(q
i
)ni=1 = (q
∗
i )
n
i=1,
(ti)
n−1
i=1 s.t. U i − U i+1 = (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
tn s.t. Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γi1 (βi+1 − βi) qi+1 = Un +
n−1∑
i=1
Γi1 (βi+1 − βi) qi+1.
By (V), q
i
≥ qi for all i ∈ I. Therefore, (VI) ensures the existence of a separating
contract ĈS satisfying (S1)–(S4) such that
(t̂i1, q̂i1)
n
i=1 = (ti, qi)
n
i=1 and (t̂ij, q̂ij)
n
i=1 = (ti, qi)
n
i=1 ∀j ∈ {2, . . . ,m}.
By (V), ĈS generates more expected surplus than the best pooling contracts. By
construction, it gives the same expected payoff to the agent. It thus improves over all
pooling contracts.
A4 Chapter 3: Formal results
Claim A4.1. There exists a cutoff R′ such that effort plan (1, 1) is optimal among all
plans (e1, e2(x1)) if R > R′.
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Proof. According to Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, the principal’s profit with effort plan
(1, 1) is 2S −A in the objective and 2S −B in the subjective scenario. The maximum
surplus with other plans (e1, e2(x1)) is max{0, S + µ(µ1R− c)}, where S + µ(µ1R− c)
is the surplus generated with plan (e1, e2(x1 = 1), e2(x1 = 0)) = (1, 1, 0). A sufficient
condition for (1, 1) being optimal among all plans (e1, e2(x1)) is therefore
(1− µ)(µ0R− c) ≥ max{A,B},
which concludes the proof.
Claim A4.2. In the subjective scenario with mediator, payment scheme (w?, b?) with
(w?00, w
?
10, w
?
01, w
?
11) =
(
0, 0,
c
µ
,
c
µµ1
+
c
µ
)
and (b?00, b
?
10, b
?
01, b
?
11) =
(
0, 0,
c
µµ1
, 0
)
implements effort plan (1, 1) as cheaply as possible.
Proof. I first derive some auxiliary results.
(IX) Consider the choice variables w00, b00, and b11. Suppose (wˆ, bˆ) satisfies all con-
straints. Then the alternative payment scheme (w′, b′) with
w′ = (0, wˆ10, wˆ01, wˆ11 + bˆ11) and b′ =
(
0, bˆ10, bˆ01 +
1− µ0
µ0
bˆ00, 0
)
also satisfies all constraints and yields the same value of the objective function.
Hence, I may without loss of generality set w00 = b00 = b11 = 0.
(X) Next, I show that the truth-telling constraint (3.9) binds. Suppose not. Then
(w˜, b˜) with
wˆ =
(
0,
c
µ
,
c
µ
,
2c
µ
)
and bˆ = (0, 0, 0, 0)
would be an optimal solution. Since it violates (3.9) and as the program is linear,
(3.9) must bind.
(XI) Consider now the choice variables w10, b10, and b01, and take (IX) and (X) into
account. The binding truth-telling condition (3.9) reads
µ1w11 + (1− µ1)(w10 + b10) = µ1(w01 + b01),
and the second truth-telling condition, (3.10), reads
µ0(w01 + b01) ≤ µ0w11 + (1− µ0)(w10 + b10).
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For the moment, ignore (3.10). Suppose (w, b) satisfies all other constraints. Then,
the alternative payment scheme (w, b) with
w =
(
0, 0, w01, w11 +
1− µ1
µ1
w10
)
and b =
(
0, 0, w11 +
1− µ1
µ1
w10 − w01, 0
)
also satisfies all constraints and yields at least the same value of the objective
function (‘at least’ because b10 = 0 is optimal). Here,
b01 = w11 +
1− µ1
µ1
w10 − w01
is indeed a non-negative transfer because w satisfies (3.3), which requires
µ[µ1w11 + (1− µ1)w10 − µ1w01] ≥ c.
The alternative payment scheme actually also satisfies the ignored truth-telling
constraint (3.10). I may hence set w10 = b10 = 0 and b01 = w11 − w01.
According to (IX)–(XI), I may search for an optimal solution among all payment
schemes (w, b) that satisfy
w = (0, 0, w01, w11) and b = (0, 0, w11 − w01, 0).
The optimal values w01, w11 can be derived from
min
w11≥0,w01≥0
µw11
s.t. µµ1(w11 − w01) ≥ c (3.3’)
µµ1w11 + (1− µ)µ0w01 ≥ c+ c (3.4’)
µµ1w11 + (1− µ)µ0w01 ≥ c. (3.8’)
This program is solved by w01 = c/µ, w11 = c/(µµ1) + c/µ.
A5 Chapter 3: Alternative subjective scenario
This appendix shows that the benefits of subjective evaluations are not a peculiarity
of the original model, in which only the principal can evaluate performance. To this
end, consider the alternative subjective scenario, which differs from the original one in
that the agent privately observes a performance signal s ∈ {0, 1} at the end of stage
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1. Let Pr(x1 = s) = α ∈ (1/2, 1) be the probability that the signal coincides with the
principal’s subjective evaluation.
The main result of this section, Claim A5.1, establishes a lower bound on the prin-
cipal’s profit. I use the notation
α0 = min {µ, (1− α)µ1 + αµ0}
A′ =
(
µ
α0
− 1
)
c.
Claim A5.1. In the alternative subjective scenario, the principal’s profit is at least
2S − A′ −B.
Observe that A′ is lower than A, the agent’s payoff in the objective scenario. In
particular, it holds that A′ + B < A if the posteriors µ0 and µ1 are sufficiently low
and high, respectively. More uncertainty thus also renders the alternative subjective
scenario advantageous for the principal.
Claim A5.1 follows from Claim A5.2. I construct a contract that implements effort
plan (1, 1) in the alternative subjective scenario using the same communication protocol
as the non-mediated contract derived in section 3.3.2. Accordingly, the payments do
not depend on the agent’s signal but only on the the principal’s reported evaluation of
stage 1 and on the objective evaluation of stage 2.26
Claim A5.2. In the alternative subjective scenario, payment scheme (w′, b′) with
(w′00, w
′
10, w
′
01, w
′
11) =
(
0, 0,
c
α0
,
c
µµ1
+
c
α0
)
and (b′00, b
′
10, b
′
01, b
′
11) =
(
0, 0,
c
µµ1
, 0
)
implements effort plan (1, 1).
Proof. First, the agent has an incentive to exert effort in stage 2 if he worked hard in
stage 1 and observes s = 1:
α[µ1w
′
11 + (1− µ1)w′10 − c] + (1− α)[µ0w′01 + (1− µ0)w′00 − c] ≥ αw′10 + (1− α)w′00.
26As the agent’s signal is only imperfectly correlated with the subjective evaluation, the budget
breaker’s payoff should be greater than zero also if the contract takes the signal into account.
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Second, the agent also has an incentive to exert effort in stage 2 if he worked hard in
stage 1 and observes s = 0:
(1− α)[µ1w′11 + (1− µ1)w′10 − c] + α[µ0w′01 + (1− µ0)w′00 − c] ≥ (1− α)w′10 + αw′00.
Moreover, w′ satisfies the conditions (3.3)–(3.5). The contract thus implements effort
plan (1, 1) if the principal is willing to submit an honest evaluation. Indeed, any report
results in the same payment for the principal:
w′11 + b
′
11 = w
′
01 + b
′
01 and w
′
10 + b
′
10 = w
′
00 + b
′
00,
which concludes the proof.
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